Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Does executive compensation mechanism balance performance with risk-taking? Evidence from China's banking system

Does executive compensation mechanism balance performance with risk-taking? Evidence from China's... In this study, the authors demonstrate the inherent connections between bank risk-taking, performance and executive compensation in the banking sector of China by developing a theoretical model and performing empirical tests with simultaneous equation models.Design/methodology/approachThe authors construct a multi-task principal-agent model to capture agency problems in China, and the model can be extended to various cases. In empirical tests, simultaneous equation models are used to examine the theoretical predictions by eliminating endogenous concerns efficiently compared with the methods in the existing literature.FindingsThe results indicate that the regulator fails to provide bank managers with positive incentives to control risk, whereas the compensation guidance policy (2010) proposed by the CBRC alleviates this problem in China. Additionally, the authors established that shareholders reward bank managers for better and more stable performance. The authors propose the introduction of restricted stock options into the compensation design, as the existing compensation design fails to balance the performance and risk-taking of banks.Research limitations/implicationsFirst, the executive compensation structure and details in China are not available. In addition, the equity-based incentive compensation is forbidden. Therefore, this paper cannot provide more details about how the compensation structure affects bank manager behaviours. Secondly, the database consists only 25 listed commercial banks. Luckily, the assets of these banks could account for the vast majority of China's banking assets. The authors also expect that new methodologies such as machine learning and deep learning will be adopted in the research on bank risk management.Practical implicationsFirst, the regulator should optimise the compositions and payment rule of bank executive compensations. Secondly, it is advisable to adopt restricted deferred share reward or stock option compensation in due course. Thirdly, the regulator can require the banks that undertake excessive risks and troubled by moral hazard to increase the independent director proportion on the bank board according to the authors' empirical tests that higher independent proportion prevents the risk accumulations effectively. Fourthly, except for absolute compensation, the gap between executives' salary and average employee's income should be taken account.Originality/valueThis study provides a theoretical framework that incorporates the manager behaviours, executive compensation and bank regulations, and it provides empirical tests by solving endogenous concerns. Additionally, this study examines the effects of China's compensation guidelines issued in 2010. The authors believe that this study adds value to the existing literature by illustrating the compensation mechanism in China. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Kybernetes Emerald Publishing

Does executive compensation mechanism balance performance with risk-taking? Evidence from China's banking system

Jiang, Yunsong; Yuan, Chao; Zhang, Jinyi
Kybernetes , Volume 53 (10): 20 – Oct 30, 2024
Download PDF
20 pages

Loading next page...
 
/lp/emerald-publishing/does-executive-compensation-mechanism-balance-performance-with-risk-0TGQoHr89p

References (25)

Publisher
Emerald Publishing
Copyright
© Emerald Publishing Limited
ISSN
0368-492X
DOI
10.1108/k-09-2022-1251
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

In this study, the authors demonstrate the inherent connections between bank risk-taking, performance and executive compensation in the banking sector of China by developing a theoretical model and performing empirical tests with simultaneous equation models.Design/methodology/approachThe authors construct a multi-task principal-agent model to capture agency problems in China, and the model can be extended to various cases. In empirical tests, simultaneous equation models are used to examine the theoretical predictions by eliminating endogenous concerns efficiently compared with the methods in the existing literature.FindingsThe results indicate that the regulator fails to provide bank managers with positive incentives to control risk, whereas the compensation guidance policy (2010) proposed by the CBRC alleviates this problem in China. Additionally, the authors established that shareholders reward bank managers for better and more stable performance. The authors propose the introduction of restricted stock options into the compensation design, as the existing compensation design fails to balance the performance and risk-taking of banks.Research limitations/implicationsFirst, the executive compensation structure and details in China are not available. In addition, the equity-based incentive compensation is forbidden. Therefore, this paper cannot provide more details about how the compensation structure affects bank manager behaviours. Secondly, the database consists only 25 listed commercial banks. Luckily, the assets of these banks could account for the vast majority of China's banking assets. The authors also expect that new methodologies such as machine learning and deep learning will be adopted in the research on bank risk management.Practical implicationsFirst, the regulator should optimise the compositions and payment rule of bank executive compensations. Secondly, it is advisable to adopt restricted deferred share reward or stock option compensation in due course. Thirdly, the regulator can require the banks that undertake excessive risks and troubled by moral hazard to increase the independent director proportion on the bank board according to the authors' empirical tests that higher independent proportion prevents the risk accumulations effectively. Fourthly, except for absolute compensation, the gap between executives' salary and average employee's income should be taken account.Originality/valueThis study provides a theoretical framework that incorporates the manager behaviours, executive compensation and bank regulations, and it provides empirical tests by solving endogenous concerns. Additionally, this study examines the effects of China's compensation guidelines issued in 2010. The authors believe that this study adds value to the existing literature by illustrating the compensation mechanism in China.

Journal

Kybernetes – Emerald Publishing

Published: Oct 30, 2024

Keywords: Executive compensation mechanism; Bank performance; Bank risk-taking

There are no references for this article.