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Prior research has investigated determinants of CEO compensation. However, that research has been primarily limited to large firms. This study investigates the impact of CEO influence over the board of directors on CEO pay for both large and small firms. Additionally, other determinants of CEO pay for both large and small firms are examined. Results suggest that CEO influence over the board significantly affects CEO pay for large firms. However, we do not find the same evidence for small firms. Firm size is the prinmary factor of CEO pay for small firms. Evidence in this study suggests that CEO pay of large firms is mostly a function of CEO influence over the board, firm size and firm performance.
Managerial Finance – Emerald Publishing
Published: Aug 1, 2000
Keywords: Accounting research; Performance‐related pay; Top management; USA
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