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- Publisher
- Emerald Publishing
- Copyright
- Copyright © Emerald Group Publishing Limited
- ISSN
- 1359-0790
- DOI
- 10.1108/JFC-08-2018-0080
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
PurposeBribery continues to significantly inhibit international development. Despite massive efforts to fight corruption, public officials in many developing countries continue to demand bribes. However, multinational corporations face severe sanctions for engaging in bribery. Hence, this paper aims to investigate whether anti-bribery incentives could help to eliminate corruption.Design/methodology/approachThis study takes an innovative approach toward eliminating corruption: it investigates the potential role of anti-bribery incentives through qualitative content analysis of 35 semi-standardized interviews with anti-bribery experts from Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland.FindingsConcrete recommendations for adjustments to incentive systems are provided in an effort to help multinational corporations fight bribery, and thereby, eliminate obstacles to international development.Originality/valueAlthough the empirical findings are based on conditions Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland, the results have potential global application.
Journal
Journal of Financial Crime – Emerald Publishing
Published: Jul 2, 2019