Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Biodiversity, trade and international agreements

Biodiversity, trade and international agreements The global market failure problem of international biodiversity loss can be mitigated through the use of trade interventions or by the creation of new international markets and institutions for the global environmental benefits generated by the biodiversity conserved by host countries. However, it may be difficult to reach a mutually agreed "trade for nature" deal when the biodiversity in the host country is threatened mainly by habitat conversion. On the other hand, if the threat is from over-exploitation, unilateral trade interventions by the recipient countries are also likely. Although there may be strong incentives for the latter countries to negotiate an international biodiversity agreement, if such incentives exist, then these countries may act unilaterally to compensate host countries for their conservation efforts. Rich countries therefore need convincing that they are likely to gain from reducing global biodiversity loss. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Economic Studies Emerald Publishing

Biodiversity, trade and international agreements

Edward B. Barbier
Journal of Economic Studies , Volume 27 (1/2): 20 – Feb 1, 2000
Download PDF
20 pages

Loading next page...
 
/lp/emerald-publishing/biodiversity-trade-and-international-agreements-Q7tDWJ5Yhw
Publisher
Emerald Publishing
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 MCB UP Ltd. All rights reserved.
ISSN
0144-3585
DOI
10.1108/EUM0000000005310
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

The global market failure problem of international biodiversity loss can be mitigated through the use of trade interventions or by the creation of new international markets and institutions for the global environmental benefits generated by the biodiversity conserved by host countries. However, it may be difficult to reach a mutually agreed "trade for nature" deal when the biodiversity in the host country is threatened mainly by habitat conversion. On the other hand, if the threat is from over-exploitation, unilateral trade interventions by the recipient countries are also likely. Although there may be strong incentives for the latter countries to negotiate an international biodiversity agreement, if such incentives exist, then these countries may act unilaterally to compensate host countries for their conservation efforts. Rich countries therefore need convincing that they are likely to gain from reducing global biodiversity loss.

Journal

Journal of Economic Studies – Emerald Publishing

Published: Feb 1, 2000

Keywords: Conservation; Global marketing; Failures; Co‐operation; Environment

References

  • The general agreement on tariffs and trade, environmental protection and sustainable development
    Arden‐Clarke, C.
  • Wealth inequality and efficiency in the commons: part I: the unregulated case
    Baland, J.‐M; Platteau, J.‐P
  • Capturing the pharmaceutical value of biodiversity in a developing country
    Barbier, E.B; Aylward, B.A
  • Trade, tropical deforestation and policy interventions
    Barbier, E.B; Rauscher, M
  • Wildlife, biodiversity and trade
    Barbier, E.B.; Schulz, C.‐E