Asset Management Companies, State‐Owned Commercial Bank Debt Transfers and Contingent Claims: Issues in the Valuation of China’s Non‐Performing Loans

Asset Management Companies, State‐Owned Commercial Bank Debt Transfers and Contingent Claims:... This article outlines contingent claims created as a result of the arrangements underlying the transfer of state‐owned commercial banks’ non‐performing loans to asset management companies. An understanding of these factors is central in analysing the potential for China’s as set management companies to realise value from their acquisition of these nonperforming state‐owned enterprise loans. After establishing the scale of the non‐performing loan problem, the article identifies and describes a number of real and financial options that may assist in the consideration of the value of assets associated with the transfer of non‐performing loans from the state‐owned commercial banks to the asset management companies. Real and financial options appear in the form of implied guarantees over asset management corporation debt, implied guarantees associated with the non‐performing assets remaining with the stateowned commercial banks, and within the equity positions held by the asset management companies as a result of equity‐for‐debt swaps initiated under the current reform process. The article concludes that any gains made to the credit standing of the state‐owned commercial banks reflect the value of implied guarantees over both the asset management corporation debt and the remaining stock of non‐performing loans held by the banks. Furthermore, institutional arrangements associated with the equity positions held by the asset management corporations significantly reduce the value of options associated with operation and control of firms in which the equity positions are held. Additionally, the structure of equity positions taken under the equity‐debt swaps suggest that the value of equity positions held in state‐owned enterprises by the asset management companies will be considerably lower than hoped for and implied in the asset management companies’ mandates. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Managerial Finance Emerald Publishing

Asset Management Companies, State‐Owned Commercial Bank Debt Transfers and Contingent Claims: Issues in the Valuation of China’s Non‐Performing Loans

Managerial Finance, Volume 31 (12): 18 – Dec 1, 2005

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Publisher
Emerald Publishing
Copyright
Copyright © 2005 Emerald Group Publishing Limited. All rights reserved.
ISSN
0307-4358
DOI
10.1108/03074350510769992
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This article outlines contingent claims created as a result of the arrangements underlying the transfer of state‐owned commercial banks’ non‐performing loans to asset management companies. An understanding of these factors is central in analysing the potential for China’s as set management companies to realise value from their acquisition of these nonperforming state‐owned enterprise loans. After establishing the scale of the non‐performing loan problem, the article identifies and describes a number of real and financial options that may assist in the consideration of the value of assets associated with the transfer of non‐performing loans from the state‐owned commercial banks to the asset management companies. Real and financial options appear in the form of implied guarantees over asset management corporation debt, implied guarantees associated with the non‐performing assets remaining with the stateowned commercial banks, and within the equity positions held by the asset management companies as a result of equity‐for‐debt swaps initiated under the current reform process. The article concludes that any gains made to the credit standing of the state‐owned commercial banks reflect the value of implied guarantees over both the asset management corporation debt and the remaining stock of non‐performing loans held by the banks. Furthermore, institutional arrangements associated with the equity positions held by the asset management corporations significantly reduce the value of options associated with operation and control of firms in which the equity positions are held. Additionally, the structure of equity positions taken under the equity‐debt swaps suggest that the value of equity positions held in state‐owned enterprises by the asset management companies will be considerably lower than hoped for and implied in the asset management companies’ mandates.

Journal

Managerial FinanceEmerald Publishing

Published: Dec 1, 2005

Keywords: Non‐performing loans; State‐owned commercial banks; Asset management companies; Corporation debt

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