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Assessing rational-choice models of budgeting--from budget-maximising to bureaushaping: a case study of british local government

Assessing rational-choice models of budgeting--from budget-maximising to bureaushaping: a case... This article assesses a rational-choice model of bureaucratic behaviour - the bureau-shaping model - as an explanation of budget-making in British local government. The bureau-shaping model is essentially a reconstructed rational-choice model of bureaucratic behaviour in liberal democratic states, which emerged from critiques of its rival budgetmaximising model. The explanatory power of the bureau-shaping model is significantly superior to the budget-maximising model. However, the explanatory power of the bureaushaping model is limited because, as a supply-side model, it cannot explain how budgets are demanded and controlled by political sponsors, who in turn are constrained politically. Budgetary decision-making takes place in a political arena where both supply and demand are mediated; a supply-side model, at best, can explain only half the budget-story. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Public Budgeting Accounting & Financial Management Emerald Publishing

Assessing rational-choice models of budgeting--from budget-maximising to bureaushaping: a case study of british local government

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References (46)

Publisher
Emerald Publishing
Copyright
Copyright © Emerald Group Publishing Limited
ISSN
1096-3367
DOI
10.1108/JPBAFM-12-04-2000-B004
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This article assesses a rational-choice model of bureaucratic behaviour - the bureau-shaping model - as an explanation of budget-making in British local government. The bureau-shaping model is essentially a reconstructed rational-choice model of bureaucratic behaviour in liberal democratic states, which emerged from critiques of its rival budgetmaximising model. The explanatory power of the bureau-shaping model is significantly superior to the budget-maximising model. However, the explanatory power of the bureaushaping model is limited because, as a supply-side model, it cannot explain how budgets are demanded and controlled by political sponsors, who in turn are constrained politically. Budgetary decision-making takes place in a political arena where both supply and demand are mediated; a supply-side model, at best, can explain only half the budget-story.

Journal

Journal of Public Budgeting Accounting & Financial ManagementEmerald Publishing

Published: Mar 1, 2000

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