Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

A socio‐economic theory of regulatory compliance

A socio‐economic theory of regulatory compliance An enriched theoretical model of regulatory compliance is developed in this paper. The body of empirical evidence demonstrates that the pure deterrence model of regulatory compliance, which focuses primarily on the certainty and severity of sanctions as key determinants of compliance, provides only a partial explanation of compliance behavior. To offer a more complete explanation, the model developed herein integrates economic theory with theories from psychology and sociology to account for both tangible and intangible motivations influencing individuals’ decisions whether to comply with a given set of regulations. Specifically, the model accounts for moral obligation and social influence in addition to the conventional costs and revenues associated with illegal behavior. While cast in a natural resource management context, the theory developed here is applicable to a variety of institutional conditions. The resulting framework enables the design and implementation of more efficient compliance and regulatory programs than was heretofore possible. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png International Journal of Social Economics Emerald Publishing

A socio‐economic theory of regulatory compliance

International Journal of Social Economics , Volume 26 (1/2/3): 20 – Jan 1, 1999

Loading next page...
 
/lp/emerald-publishing/a-socio-economic-theory-of-regulatory-compliance-wr00zYSX64

References (52)

Publisher
Emerald Publishing
Copyright
Copyright © 1999 MCB UP Ltd. All rights reserved.
ISSN
0306-8293
DOI
10.1108/03068299910229569
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

An enriched theoretical model of regulatory compliance is developed in this paper. The body of empirical evidence demonstrates that the pure deterrence model of regulatory compliance, which focuses primarily on the certainty and severity of sanctions as key determinants of compliance, provides only a partial explanation of compliance behavior. To offer a more complete explanation, the model developed herein integrates economic theory with theories from psychology and sociology to account for both tangible and intangible motivations influencing individuals’ decisions whether to comply with a given set of regulations. Specifically, the model accounts for moral obligation and social influence in addition to the conventional costs and revenues associated with illegal behavior. While cast in a natural resource management context, the theory developed here is applicable to a variety of institutional conditions. The resulting framework enables the design and implementation of more efficient compliance and regulatory programs than was heretofore possible.

Journal

International Journal of Social EconomicsEmerald Publishing

Published: Jan 1, 1999

Keywords: Enforcement; Moral responsibility; Natural resources; Regulations; Social responsibility

There are no references for this article.