Voluntary disclosure of precision information

Voluntary disclosure of precision information This paper presents a model of an entrepreneur's acquisition and voluntary disclosure of precision information as a supplement to primary disclosure of an estimate of a tradable asset's value. Our analysis shows that equilibrium disclosure can be characterized by four regions. For estimates above (below) the prior expectation of the asset value, the entrepreneur discloses only high (low) precision information. The main idea is to enhance (diminish) confidence in estimates that improve upon (detract from) prior beliefs. We further show that the entrepreneur over-invests in the acquisition of precision information due to the option value of discretion over disclosure. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Accounting and Economics Elsevier

Voluntary disclosure of precision information

Loading next page...
 
/lp/elsevier/voluntary-disclosure-of-precision-information-01QN96uWiD
Publisher
Elsevier
Copyright
Copyright © 2003 Elsevier B.V.
ISSN
0165-4101
DOI
10.1016/j.jacceco.2003.05.002
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This paper presents a model of an entrepreneur's acquisition and voluntary disclosure of precision information as a supplement to primary disclosure of an estimate of a tradable asset's value. Our analysis shows that equilibrium disclosure can be characterized by four regions. For estimates above (below) the prior expectation of the asset value, the entrepreneur discloses only high (low) precision information. The main idea is to enhance (diminish) confidence in estimates that improve upon (detract from) prior beliefs. We further show that the entrepreneur over-invests in the acquisition of precision information due to the option value of discretion over disclosure.

Journal

Journal of Accounting and EconomicsElsevier

Published: Jun 1, 2004

References

  • The role of supplementary statements with management earnings forecasts
    Hutton, A.P.; Miller, G.S.; Skinner, D.J.
  • Discretionary disclosure, efficiency, and signal informativeness
    Pae, S.

You’re reading a free preview. Subscribe to read the entire article.


DeepDyve is your
personal research library

It’s your single place to instantly
discover and read the research
that matters to you.

Enjoy affordable access to
over 18 million articles from more than
15,000 peer-reviewed journals.

All for just $49/month

Explore the DeepDyve Library

Search

Query the DeepDyve database, plus search all of PubMed and Google Scholar seamlessly

Organize

Save any article or search result from DeepDyve, PubMed, and Google Scholar... all in one place.

Access

Get unlimited, online access to over 18 million full-text articles from more than 15,000 scientific journals.

Your journals are on DeepDyve

Read from thousands of the leading scholarly journals from SpringerNature, Elsevier, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford University Press and more.

All the latest content is available, no embargo periods.

See the journals in your area

DeepDyve

Freelancer

DeepDyve

Pro

Price

FREE

$49/month
$360/year

Save searches from
Google Scholar,
PubMed

Create folders to
organize your research

Export folders, citations

Read DeepDyve articles

Abstract access only

Unlimited access to over
18 million full-text articles

Print

20 pages / month

PDF Discount

20% off