Finding a moving fugitive. A game theoretic representation of search

Finding a moving fugitive. A game theoretic representation of search We develop and analyze a “manhunting” game involving a mobile hider, who wishes to maximize his time to capture, and a mobile searcher, who wishes to minimize this same time. The game takes place within a variegated environment that offers better and worse locations to evade capture. The hider is able to move from one hide site to another at will. In choosing a hide site, he must consider the risk of discovery, the risk that he will be betrayed, and the risk that he will be captured while moving from one site to another. The searcher can select any cell to search within the fugitive's feasible hiding set. We examine the strategic behavior of both players and provide examples. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Computers & Operations Research Elsevier

Finding a moving fugitive. A game theoretic representation of search

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Publisher
Elsevier
Copyright
Copyright © 2006 Elsevier Ltd
ISSN
0305-0548
eISSN
1873-765X
D.O.I.
10.1016/j.cor.2006.09.020
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We develop and analyze a “manhunting” game involving a mobile hider, who wishes to maximize his time to capture, and a mobile searcher, who wishes to minimize this same time. The game takes place within a variegated environment that offers better and worse locations to evade capture. The hider is able to move from one hide site to another at will. In choosing a hide site, he must consider the risk of discovery, the risk that he will be betrayed, and the risk that he will be captured while moving from one site to another. The searcher can select any cell to search within the fugitive's feasible hiding set. We examine the strategic behavior of both players and provide examples.

Journal

Computers & Operations ResearchElsevier

Published: Jun 1, 2008

References

  • The search value of a network
    Alpern, S.; Asic, M.

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