Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Loading next page...
/lp/edinburgh-university-press/in-defence-of-c-s-lewis-soul-making-theodicy-a-reply-to-wolterstorff-ViSjejykQ0
- Publisher
- Edinburgh University Press
- Copyright
- Copyright © Edinburgh University Press
- ISSN
- 2045-8797
- eISSN
- 2045-8800
- DOI
- 10.3366/ink.2019.0048
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
In The Problem of Pain, C.S. Lewis offers a multi-pronged Christian explanation for the suffering in the world. Lewis first develops a free will theodicy, according to which much of the suffering in our world is a by-product of human free will. To account for the remaining suffering (caused by, for instance, disease and natural disasters), Lewis develops a version of the soul-making theodicy, according to which some of the suffering in the world is permitted by God as part of a divine project of improving the moral character of human beings. Nicholas Wolterstorff has recently raised some interesting challenges for Lewis's soul-making theodicy. In this essay I respond to Wolterstorff's critique by drawing not only on Lewis's broader corpus beyond The Problem of Pain but also, to a lesser extent, on the thought of two other contemporary proponents of the soul-making theodicy, John Hick and Trent Dougherty. My main goal is to make the case that Lewis's version of the soul-making theodicy has more depth and resilience than Wolterstorff's critique suggests.
Journal
Journal of Inklings Studies – Edinburgh University Press
Published: Oct 1, 2019