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END OF STORY 8:2 Copyright 2002 by Duke University Press The Usual Motives What is remarkable about this Palmerston doctrine is that the end of an argument is not attributed to any of the usual motives. The usual motives are three. First, an argument may end because one of the participants has demonstrated that everybody else’s view was inconsistent or false or both, and because that demonstration has been accepted by everybody involved. We could call this the Protarchus motif. In Plato’s Philebus, Protarchus, Socrates’ interlocutor, remarks, toward the end: “The point has been reached, Socrates, at which we all agree that your conclusions are completely true.”3 Second, an argument may end because one of the participants has persuaded the others to drop certain (but not necessarily all) of their views. The fact that one has been persuaded by someone else usually elicits less effusive manifestations of agreement, and so there are really not many analogues of Protarchus’s straightforward avowal. Even Gorgias’s flattering self-description, in Plato’s eponymous dialogue (“The rhetorician is competent to speak against anybody on any subject, and to prove himself more convincing before a crowd on practically every topic he wishes”),4 testifies to the fact that persuasion remains http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Common Knowledge Duke University Press

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Tamen, Miguel
Common Knowledge , Volume 8 (2) – Apr 1, 2002
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Publisher
Duke University Press
Copyright
Copyright 2002 by Duke University Press
ISSN
0961-754X
eISSN
1538-4578
DOI
10.1215/0961754X-8-2-357
Publisher site
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Abstract

8:2 Copyright 2002 by Duke University Press The Usual Motives What is remarkable about this Palmerston doctrine is that the end of an argument is not attributed to any of the usual motives. The usual motives are three. First, an argument may end because one of the participants has demonstrated that everybody else’s view was inconsistent or false or both, and because that demonstration has been accepted by everybody involved. We could call this the Protarchus motif. In Plato’s Philebus, Protarchus, Socrates’ interlocutor, remarks, toward the end: “The point has been reached, Socrates, at which we all agree that your conclusions are completely true.”3 Second, an argument may end because one of the participants has persuaded the others to drop certain (but not necessarily all) of their views. The fact that one has been persuaded by someone else usually elicits less effusive manifestations of agreement, and so there are really not many analogues of Protarchus’s straightforward avowal. Even Gorgias’s flattering self-description, in Plato’s eponymous dialogue (“The rhetorician is competent to speak against anybody on any subject, and to prove himself more convincing before a crowd on practically every topic he wishes”),4 testifies to the fact that persuasion remains

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Common Knowledge – Duke University Press

Published: Apr 1, 2002

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