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DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM AFTER MILITARY OCCUPATION: Reflections on the United States' Experience in Japan, Germany, Afghanistan, and Iraq

DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM AFTER MILITARY OCCUPATION: Reflections on the United States'... Stanley N. In 1943, arguably before it was even clear that the Allies would defeat Japan and Germany, the U.S. government set up training programs at the University of Virginia and at Yale to equip (with the language and administrative skills that they would require) those who might later have to oversee transitions from authoritarianism to democracy. Sixty years later, we read in the New York Times of a senior U.S. staff officer noting that, on entering Baghdad, his division had no further orders whatsoever—no instructions about where to go, who to see, how or what to occupy, what to do.1 Among other things, it is the level of forethought and preparedness and levelheadedness revealed by the administrator-training program in 1943 that made the nation-building and democratization experiments in Japan and Germany after 1945 so successful. And it is, I fear, the level of unpreparedness and 1. Michael Doyle mentions these two episodes in his contribution to Multilateral Strategies to Promote Democracy (New York: Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, 2003), 39. 12:2 DOI 10.1215/0961754X-2005-001 © 2006 by Duke University Press muddleheadedness that left a U.S. army division without orders in Baghdad that puts at great risk http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Common Knowledge Duke University Press

DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM AFTER MILITARY OCCUPATION: Reflections on the United States' Experience in Japan, Germany, Afghanistan, and Iraq

Katz, Stanley N.
Common Knowledge , Volume 12 (2) – Apr 1, 2006
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Publisher
Duke University Press
Copyright
Copyright 2006 by Duke University Press
ISSN
0961-754X
eISSN
1538-4578
DOI
10.1215/0961754X-2005-001
Publisher site
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Abstract

Stanley N. In 1943, arguably before it was even clear that the Allies would defeat Japan and Germany, the U.S. government set up training programs at the University of Virginia and at Yale to equip (with the language and administrative skills that they would require) those who might later have to oversee transitions from authoritarianism to democracy. Sixty years later, we read in the New York Times of a senior U.S. staff officer noting that, on entering Baghdad, his division had no further orders whatsoever—no instructions about where to go, who to see, how or what to occupy, what to do.1 Among other things, it is the level of forethought and preparedness and levelheadedness revealed by the administrator-training program in 1943 that made the nation-building and democratization experiments in Japan and Germany after 1945 so successful. And it is, I fear, the level of unpreparedness and 1. Michael Doyle mentions these two episodes in his contribution to Multilateral Strategies to Promote Democracy (New York: Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, 2003), 39. 12:2 DOI 10.1215/0961754X-2005-001 © 2006 by Duke University Press muddleheadedness that left a U.S. army division without orders in Baghdad that puts at great risk

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Common Knowledge – Duke University Press

Published: Apr 1, 2006

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