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COLUMNS Barry Allen When Hilary Putnam wrote in eulogy of his late colleague W. V. O. Quine, he began by asking what it was that made Quine an important philosopher.1 He went on to talk about two kinds of philosophers, those whose arguments were plausible and those whose arguments were and have ever been unbelievable. He counts Quine among the unbelievable (Berkeley is another). If you think you agree with Quine â if you think ontology is relative, translation indeterminate, and that words and sentences have no meaning â you donât really understand what heâs saying. If you understand it, you see itâs crazy, despite Quineâs elegant arguments. Putnam says Richard Rorty is the only philosopher he knows who both understands and believes Quineâs unbelievable arguments. I am struck by the quick move from âimportant philosopherâ to a discussion on the relative merits of an argument. In the sciences, a personal name (Gödel, Darwin) is often shorthand for a proof or theory. Putnam implies that itâs that way in philosophy too. An important philosopher is an important argument. Important doesnât mean true; it doesnât even have to be plausible, just important. I wonder if Putnam is right, though,
Common Knowledge – Duke University Press
Published: Apr 1, 2008
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