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- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Copyright
- © The Author 2005. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Law and Economics Association. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oupjournals.org
- ISSN
- 1465-7252
- eISSN
- 1465-7260
- DOI
- 10.1093/aler/ahi008
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Jump-starting stock markets in transition economies has proved difficult. These countries lack effective legal governance structures and face severe information problems. Yet not all financial markets failed because of adverse conditions. Using China’s initial stock market development as a case study, this article suggests that administrative governance can substitute for formal legal governance. At the core of this governance structure was the quota system. It created incentives for regional competition and decentralized information collection at the IPO stage. It was also used to punish regions and responsible officials when companies from their regions failed, as evidenced herein.
Journal
American Law and Economics Review – Oxford University Press
Published: Jan 1, 2005