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- Publisher
- Annual Reviews
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2012 by Annual Reviews. All rights reserved
- ISSN
- 1094-2939
- eISSN
- 1545-1577
- DOI
- 10.1146/annurev-polisci-031710-103823
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Competitive elections create a relationship of formal accountability between policy makers and citizens. Recent theoretical work suggests that there are limits on how well this formal accountability links policy decisions to citizen preferences. In particular, incumbents' incentives are driven not by the voters' evaluation of the normative desirability of outcomes but by the outcome's information about the incumbent's type (e.g., competence or ideology). This review surveys both this body of theory and the robust empirical literature it has spawned. It concludes with a short discussion of ongoing work that attempts to integrate this theoretical perspective with a richer view of policy-making institutions.
Journal
Annual Review of Political Science – Annual Reviews
Published: Jun 15, 2012