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VOTING IN FIRMS: THE ROLE OF AGENDA CONTROL, SIZE AND VOTER HOMOGENEITY

VOTING IN FIRMS: THE ROLE OF AGENDA CONTROL, SIZE AND VOTER HOMOGENEITY Voting is a common feature of most firms. Unrestricted voting, however, can lead to unstable decision making. We find that firms make tradeoffs among collective decision making, production scale, firm structure, and voter characteristics that are consistent with efforts to economize on the costs of voting. Firm responses include agenda control, restrictions to obtain a homogeneous voting population, and limits on firm size. We consider three long‐surviving producer cooperatives, representing extreme cases of collective decision making, and find that their organization is sensitive to the costs of voting and to the employment of mechanisms to constrain those costs. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Economic Inquiry Wiley

VOTING IN FIRMS: THE ROLE OF AGENDA CONTROL, SIZE AND VOTER HOMOGENEITY

Economic Inquiry , Volume 29 (4) – Oct 1, 1991

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References (15)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
Copyright © 1991 Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company
ISSN
0095-2583
eISSN
1465-7295
DOI
10.1111/j.1465-7295.1991.tb00856.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Voting is a common feature of most firms. Unrestricted voting, however, can lead to unstable decision making. We find that firms make tradeoffs among collective decision making, production scale, firm structure, and voter characteristics that are consistent with efforts to economize on the costs of voting. Firm responses include agenda control, restrictions to obtain a homogeneous voting population, and limits on firm size. We consider three long‐surviving producer cooperatives, representing extreme cases of collective decision making, and find that their organization is sensitive to the costs of voting and to the employment of mechanisms to constrain those costs.

Journal

Economic InquiryWiley

Published: Oct 1, 1991

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