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- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Copyright
- © The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org.
- Subject
- Article
- ISSN
- 0893-9454
- eISSN
- 1465-7368
- DOI
- 10.1093/rfs/hhn091
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Sweden offers a unique natural experiment to analyze the effects of institutionalized saving on the ownership structure, corporate governance, and firm performance. The Swedish pension reform increased the stock market participation of pension funds, causing a significant reshuffling in the ownership of pension funds. We show that the effects of institutional investment on firm performance depend on the industry structure of pension funds. Firm valuation improves if public pension funds and large independent private pension funds increase their shareholdings. Additionally, controlling shareholders appear reluctant to relinquish control and the control premium increases if public pension funds acquire shares.
Journal
The Review of Financial Studies – Oxford University Press
Published: Oct 8, 2009
Keywords: JEL Classification G3 G23