Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
J. Frankel, Kenneth Froot (1991)
Chartists, Fundamentalists and the Demand for DollarsNBER Working Paper Series
A. Kyle (1985)
Continuous Auctions and Insider TradingEconometrica, 53
W. Reddaway (1937)
THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEYEconomic Record, 12
J. Keynes, Elizabeth Johnson, D. Moggridge (1978)
The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes: The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money
Robert Verrecchia (1982)
Information Acquisition in a Noisy Rational Expectations EconomyEconometrica, 50
J. Delong, A. Shleifer, L. Summers, R. Waldmann (1989)
Positive Feedback Investment Strategies and Destabilizing Rational SpeculationCapital Markets: Asset Pricing & Valuation
(1988)
A theory of intraday trading patterns
DeLong DeLong, Andrei Andrei, Lawrence Lawrence, Robert Robert (1990a)
The economic consequences of noise tradersJournal of Political Economy, 98
Jeremy Bulow, J. Geanakoplos, P. Klemperer (1985)
Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and ComplementsJournal of Political Economy, 93
J. Tirole (1982)
On the Possibility of Speculation under Rational ExpectationsEconometrica, 50
O. Blanchard, M. Watson (1982)
Bubbles, Rational Expectations and Financial MarketsCapital Markets: Asset Pricing & Valuation eJournal
D. Scharfstein, J. Stein (1990)
Herd Behavior and InvestmentThe American Economic Review, 80
Sanford Grossman (1980)
On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient MarketsERN: Efficient Market Hypothesis Models (Topic)
DeLong DeLong, Andrei Andrei, Lawrence Lawrence, Robert Robert (1990b)
Positive feedback investment strategies and destabilizing rational speculationJournal of Finance, 45
J. Stein (1989)
Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate BehaviorQuarterly Journal of Economics, 104
M. Katz, C. Shapiro (1985)
Network Externalities, Competition, and CompatibilityThe American Economic Review, 75
J. Long, A. Shleifer, Lawrence Summers, Robert Waldmann (1990)
Noise Trader Risk in Financial MarketsJournal of Political Economy, 98
Russell Cooper, A. John (1988)
Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian ModelsQuarterly Journal of Economics, 103
M. Hellwig (1980)
On the aggregation of information in competitive marketsJournal of Economic Theory, 22
J. Stein (1987)
Informational Externalities and Welfare-Reducing SpeculationJournal of Political Economy, 95
J. Keynes (1937)
The General Theory of EmploymentQuarterly Journal of Economics, 51
Bengt Holmstrom, J. Costa (1986)
Managerial Incentives and Capital ManagementQuarterly Journal of Economics, 101
Sanford Grossman (1976)
ON THE EFFICIENCY OF COMPETITIVE STOCK MARKETS WHERE TRADES HAVE DIVERSE INFORMATIONJournal of Finance, 31
M. Narayanan (1985)
Observability and the payback criterionThe Journal of Business, 58
J. Delong, A. Shleifer, L. Summers, R. Waldmann (1987)
The Economic Consequences of Noise TradersCapital Markets: Market Efficiency
(1990)
1990b, Positive feedback
Joseph Farrell, Garth Saloner (1985)
Standardization, Compatibility, and InnovationThe RAND Journal of Economics, 16
M. Pagano (1989)
Endogenous Market Thinness and Stock Price VolatilityThe Review of Economic Studies, 56
Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny (1990)
Equilibrium Short Horizons of Investors and FirmsThe American Economic Review, 80
Anat Admati, P. Pfleiderer (1988)
A Theory of Intraday Patterns: Volume and Price VariabilityReview of Financial Studies, 1
ABSTRACT Standard models of informed speculation suggest that traders try to learn information that others do not have. This result implicitly relies on the assumption that speculators have long horizons, i.e., can hold the asset forever. By contrast, we show that if speculators have short horizons, they may herd on the same information, trying to learn what other informed traders also know. There can be multiple herding equilibria, and herding speculators may even choose to study information that is completely unrelated to fundamentals.
The Journal of Finance – Wiley
Published: Sep 1, 1992
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.