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Competition in two‐sided markets

Competition in two‐sided markets Many markets involve two groups of agents who interact via “platforms,“ where one group's benefit from joining a platform depends on the size of the other group that joins the platform. I present three models of such markets: a monopoly platform; a model of competing platforms where agents join a single platform; and a model of “competitive bottlenecks” where one group joins all platforms. The determinants of equilibrium prices are (i) the magnitude of the cross‐group externalities, (ii) whether fees are levied on a lump‐sum or per‐transaction basis, and (iii) whether agents join one platform or several platforms. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Rand Journal of Economics Wiley

Competition in two‐sided markets

The Rand Journal of Economics , Volume 37 (3) – Sep 1, 2006

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References (39)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
Copyright © 2006 Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company
ISSN
0741-6261
eISSN
1756-2171
DOI
10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00037.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Many markets involve two groups of agents who interact via “platforms,“ where one group's benefit from joining a platform depends on the size of the other group that joins the platform. I present three models of such markets: a monopoly platform; a model of competing platforms where agents join a single platform; and a model of “competitive bottlenecks” where one group joins all platforms. The determinants of equilibrium prices are (i) the magnitude of the cross‐group externalities, (ii) whether fees are levied on a lump‐sum or per‐transaction basis, and (iii) whether agents join one platform or several platforms.

Journal

The Rand Journal of EconomicsWiley

Published: Sep 1, 2006

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