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- Publisher
- Springer Journals
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2006 by Springer Science + Business Media, Inc.
- Subject
- Economics; Public Finance; Political Science; History of Economic Thought/Methodology
- ISSN
- 0889-3047
- eISSN
- 1573-7128
- DOI
- 10.1007/s11138-006-7345-4
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
We examine the ability of focal points to transform situations of potential conflict into situations of cooperation. In performing this function, focal points convert “worst-case scenarios” into “better-case scenarios,” which are easier for political economic systems to handle. Focal points thus contribute to the ability of political economies to perform well in the face of less than ideal conditions, enhancing systemic robustness.
Journal
The Review of Austrian Economics – Springer Journals
Published: Jan 1, 2006