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Lang Lang, Stulz Stulz, Walkling Walkling (1989)
Managerial performance, Tobin's q and the gains from successful tender offersJournal of Financial Economics, 24
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The R&D Master File DocumentationNBER Working Paper Series
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ABSTRACT This paper analyzes the relation between takeover gains and the q ratios of targets and bidders for a sample of 704 mergers and tender offers over the period 1972–1987. Target, bidder, and total returns are larger when targets have low q ratios and bidders have high q ratios. The relation is strengthened after controlling for the characteristics of the offer and the contest. This evidence confirms the results of the work by Lang, Stulz, and Walkling and shows that their findings also hold for mergers and after controlling for other determinants of takeover gains.
The Journal of Finance – Wiley
Published: Mar 1, 1991
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