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- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- © American Finance Association
- ISSN
- 0022-1082
- eISSN
- 1540-6261
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00691.x
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
ABSTRACT The takeover market is often suggested as appropriate for containing the agency problems of excessive corporate cash holdings. However, recent studies report contradictory evidence. I focus on the takeover‐deterrence effects of corporate liquidity and suggest the proxy contest as an effective alternative control mechanism. I find that proxy fight targets hold 23% more cash than comparable firms, and that the probability of a contest is significantly increasing in excess cash holdings. Proxy fight announcement return also is positively related to excess cash. Following a contest, executive turnover and special cash distributions to shareholders increase, while cash holdings significantly decline.
Journal
The Journal of Finance – Wiley
Published: Oct 1, 2004