Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
D. Wittman (1995)
The myth of democratic failure
Amilcare Puviani, F. Volpi
Teoria della illusione finanziarea
G. Scofield (1990)
The calculus of consent.The Hastings Center report, 20 1
Charles Tiebout (1956)
A Pure Theory of Local ExpendituresJournal of Political Economy, 64
R. Wagner (1997)
Choice, Exchange, and Public FinanceThe American Economic Review, 87
P. Coughlin, S. Nitzan (1981)
Electoral outcomes with probabilistic voting and Nash social welfare maximaJournal of Public Economics, 15
A. Marco
Carattere teorico dell' economia finanziaria
R. Wagner (1997)
Parasitical Political Pricing, Economic Calculation, and the Size of Government: Variations on a Theme by Maffeo Pantaleoni*, 15
O. Kayaalp (2004)
The National Element in the Development of Fiscal Theory
James Tullock (1962)
The Calculus of ConsentAustralian Quarterly, 35
Actually, forestry as a science is just one aspect of cameralism
Von dem Verfasser des Lehrbegriffs sämmtlicher ökonomischer und Kameralwissenschaften
P. Hennipman (1982)
Wicksell and Pareto: Their Relationship in the Theory of Public FinanceHistory of Political Economy, 14
E. Dittrich (1974)
Die deutschen und Österreichischen Kameralisten
(2001)
Öffentliche Finanzen in der Demokratie, 4 ed
(1911)
Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (The Theory of Economic Development)
(1958)
Contributo alla teoria del riparto delle spese pubbliche.
(1911)
Considerazioni sulle proprieta di un sistema di prezzi politici.
Juergen Backhaus, R. Wagner (1987)
The cameralists: A public choice perspectivePublic Choice, 53
F. Foldvary (1994)
Public Goods And Private Communities
Giovanni Montemartini
Le basi fondamentali di una scienza finanziaria pura
J. Fichte
Der geschlossene Handelsstaat
(1781)
Grundris der Forstwissenschaft zum Gebrauch dirigirender Forst- und Kameralbedienten, auch Privatgutsbesitzern
(1911)
Das Gesamtbild der Volkswirtschaft translated as "The Economy as a Whole
R. Weizsäcker (1997)
Rezension zu: Kraan, Dirk-Jan: Budgetary Decisions : A Public Choice Approach. Cambridge, 1996
Veit Seckendorff, Ludwig Fertig (1976)
Teutscher Fürsten Stat
W. Hettich, S. Winer (1999)
Democratic Choice and Taxation
R. Jha (1998)
Modern Public Economics
Aleksei Savatyugin (2002)
The History of Economic AnalysisEconomic Sociology, 3
(1995)
and we should especially like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing out a number of ambiguities
(1984)
Politics of the Budgetary Process, 4 ed
A. Small
The cameralists, the pioneers of German social polity
R. Musgrave, A. Peacock (1959)
Classics in the theory of public finance
G. Becker (1982)
Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence
Von einer Erwegung der Staatsgeschäfte
(1883)
Finanzwissenschaft, 3 ed
A. Marco (1936)
First principles of public finance
J. Buchanan (1967)
Public finance in democratic process
(1996)
Budgetary Decisions: A Public Choice Analysis
(1994)
Turtles, Termites, and Traffic Jams
R. Wagner (2003)
Public Choice and the Diffusion of Classic Italian Public Finance, 11
J. Backhaus (1997)
Essays on social security and taxation: Gustav von Schmoller and Adolph Wagner reconsidered
(1896)
Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen debst Darstellung und Kritik des Steuersystems Schwedens
J. Backhaus (2002)
Fiscal Sociology: What for?The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 61
K. Wicksell (1958)
A New Principle of Just Taxation
A. Schäffle
Bau und Leben des socialen Körpers
R. Wagner (1988)
The Calculus of consent: A Wicksellian retrospectivePublic Choice, 56
the origins of the Continental orientation in the work of the cameralists, then describe the emergence of a distinct Continental orientation in the late nineteenth century, and close by noting how the development of public choice in the second half of the twentieth century is really a continuation of the Continental orientation toward public ï¬nance. A Complaint and a Quarrel: Framing the Disjunction In his 1896 treatise on public ï¬nance, Knut Wicksell ([1896] 1958, 82) complained that the theory of public ï¬nance âseems to have retained the assumptions of its infancy, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when absolute power ruled almost all Europe.â Absolute power is the possession of an autonomous ruler or state. Such a state might be ruthlessly despotic or it might be relatively benevolent, but it will be autonomous in any case. Sacriï¬ce theories of taxation can be construed in this setting as recipes for the practice of benevolence toward ruled subjects. Wicksell argued that under parliamentary democracies it made no sense to regard subjects as being ruled, for they participated in their own governance through parliamentary institutions. For Wicksell, the challenge to ï¬scal theorizing was to map the contours of such governance when
History of Political Economy – Duke University Press
Published: Jan 1, 2005
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.