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Firm‐specific information and efficient resource allocation*Contemporary Accounting Research, 5
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Abstract. A key characteristic of the reporting of private management information is that managers do not always report their information, and they reveal or withhold both “good” and “bad” news. Several recent papers provide models of managers' voluntary disclosure decisions. These models are typically constructed so that managers do not always disclose or withhold their information, despite rational behavior by both the privately informed managers and interested uninformed parties external to the firm. Our paper seeks to contribute further to this literature by developing a richer model of the forces that might influence a manager's decision to disclose private information. Our model is a direct extension of the model in Darrough and Stoughton (1990). In our model, there is a continuum of possible private incumbent signals and the entrant may be privately informed about the cost of entry. Partial disclosure of private information results from the tension that exists between an informed manager's desire to communicate good news to (and hide bad news from) the capital market and his desire to communicate bad news to (and hide good news from) competitors in the firm's product market. Résumé. La communication par la direction de l'information privilégiée qu'elle détient présente une caractéristique déterminante: les gestionnaires ne font pas toujours état de cette information, et ils révèlent ou retiennent l'information aussi bien «positive» que «négative ≫. Dans plusieurs études récentes sont proposés des modèles décisionnels en matière de présentation volontaire d'information par les gestionnaires. Ces modèles sont habituellement construits de telle sorte que les gestionnaires ne communiquent ou ne retiennent pas toujours l'information, malgré le comportement rationnel affiché tant par les gestionnaires dépositaires de l'information privilègiée que par les parties intéressées extérieures à l'entreprise qui ne disposent pas de cette information. Les auteurs ont voulu ici enrichir ces études en élaborant un modèle plus étoffé des forces susceptibles d'influer sur la décision du gestionnaire de communiquer l'information privilégiée dont il dispose.
Contemporary Accounting Research – Wiley
Published: Sep 1, 1992
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