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The main purpose of this paper is to examine underwriters’ response to issuers’ ineffective corporate governance. Given the growing importance of corporate governance for the success of equity offerings, we examine this response using a sample of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Previous studies suggest various rationales behind underwriter syndication, such as risk sharing, market-making, information production, certification, and monitoring. We offer an information-asymmetry-reduction hypothesis for the persistence of underwriter syndication. We argue that less effective corporate governance decreases information credibility, which, in turn, increases information asymmetry, leading underwriters to increase syndicate size to mitigate subsequent agency problems. Consistent with this prediction, we find that the size of the underwriter syndication is inversely related to proxies that measure the effectiveness of corporate governance. Results remain robust even after controlling for other confounding factors.
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting – Springer Journals
Published: Dec 7, 2010
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