Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Loading next page...
/lp/oxford-university-press/extreme-governance-an-analysis-of-dual-class-firms-in-the-united-j0ZoXW1fbG
References (66)
-
E. Fama, K. French (1993)
Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bondsJournal of Financial Economics, 33
-
Stuart Gillan, Jay Hartzell, L. Starks (2003)
Explaining Corporate Governance: Boards, Bylaws, and Charter ProvisionsS&P Global Market Intelligence Research Paper Series
-
L. Bebchuk, John IV, Guhan Subramanian (2002)
The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence and PolicyNBER Working Paper Series
-
Wenzhi Ding, Ross Levine, Chen Lin, Wensi Xie (1996)
Journal of Financial Economics -
Narayan Naik, P. Yadav (2003)
Do Dealer Firms Manage Inventory on a Stock-by-Stock or a Portfolio Basis?Risk Management eJournal
-
J. Heckman (1979)
Sample selection bias as a specification errorApplied Econometrics, 31
-
L. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, Allen Ferrell (2004)
What Matters in Corporate Governance?Corporate Law: Securities Law
-
Hyun-Han Shin, René Stulz (2000)
Firm Value, Risk, and Growth OpportunitiesCorporate Finance: Valuation
-
Tatiana Nenova (2003)
The value of corporate voting rights and control: A cross-country analysisJournal of Financial Economics, 68
-
E. Fama, James MacBeth (1973)
Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical TestsJournal of Political Economy, 81
-
(2005)
Thy Neighbor's Portfolio: Word-of-Mouth Effects in the Holdings and Trades of Money Managers -
Scott Smart, C. Zutter (2000)
Control as a Motivation for Underpricing: A Comparison of Dual- and Single-Class IposJournal of Financial Abstracts eJournal
-
Stephen Taylor, G. Whittred (1998)
Security design and the allocation of voting rights: Evidence from the Australian IPO marketJournal of Corporate Finance, 4
-
R. Moyer, R. Rao, Phillip Sisneros (1992)
Substitutes for Voting Rights: Evidence From Dual Class RecapitalizationsFinancial Management, 21
-
Henrik Cronqvist, Mattias Nilsson (2004)
The Choice between Rights Offerings and Private Equity PlacementsEuropean Finance Association Meetings (EFA) (Archive)
-
L. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen (2004)
The Costs of Entrenched BoardsLSN: Corporate Law (Topic)
-
(2005)
Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches, working paper, Social Science Research Network -
J. Shea (1996)
Instrument Relevance in Multivariate Linear Models: A Simple MeasureReview of Economics and Statistics, 79
-
C. Holderness, R. Kroszner, D. Sheehan (1998)
Were the Good Old Days that Good? Changes in Managerial Stock Ownership Since the Great DepressionCorporate Finance: Governance
-
John Mcconnell, H. Servaes (1990)
Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate valueJournal of Financial Economics, 27
-
J. Core, W. Guay, T. Rusticus (2004)
Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An Examination of Firm Operating Performance and Investors' ExpectationsCorporate Finance: Governance
-
D. Staiger, J. Stock (1994)
Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak InstrumentsEconometrics eJournal
-
Fan Yang, R. Morck (2001)
The Mysterious Growing Value of S&P Index MembershipEFA 2002 Submissions
-
(2004)
Shareholder Rights and Executive Compensation, University of Pennsylvania Working Paper -
Henrik Cronqvist, Mattias Nilsson (2003)
Agency Costs of Controlling Minority ShareholdersJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38
-
R. Porta, Florencio Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny (1999)
Investor Protection and Corporate ValuationChicago Booth: Fama-Miller Working Paper Series
-
Luigi Zingales (1995)
What Determines the Value of Corporate VotesQuarterly Journal of Economics, 110
-
Belén Villalonga, R. Amit (2004)
How Do Family Ownership, Control, and Management Affect Firm Value?Corporate Finance: Governance
-
M. Cremers, Vinay Nair (2003)
Governance Mechanisms and Equity PricesExperimental & Empirical Studies eJournal
-
Ben Amoako-Adu, Brian Smith (2001)
Dual class firms: Capitalization, ownership structure and recapitalization back into single classJournal of Banking and Finance, 25
-
Shmuel Hauser, Beni Lauterbach (2004)
The Value of Voting Rights to Majority Shareholders: Evidence from Dual Class Stock UnificationsEmpirical Studies eJournal
-
S. Kaplan, Luigi Zingales (1997)
Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful Measures of Financing Constraints?Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112
-
E. Fama, K. French (1997)
Industry costs of equityJournal of Financial Economics, 43
-
Marcia Cornett, Michael Vetsuypens (1989)
Voting rights and shareholder wealth the issuance of limited voting common stockManagerial and Decision Economics, 10
-
(2002)
Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression -
L. Field, Jonathan Karpoff (2002)
Takeover Defenses of IPO FirmsIO: Firm Structure
-
L. Bebchuk (2002)
The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate TakeoversOrganizations & Markets eJournal
-
G. Jarrell, A. Poulsen (1988)
Dual-class recapitalizations as antitakeover mechanisms: The recent evidenceJournal of Financial Economics, 20
-
M. Harris, A. Raviv (1988)
Corporate governance: Voting rights and majority rulesJournal of Financial Economics, 20
-
Christopher Baum, M. Schaffer, S. Stillman (2003)
Instrumental Variables and GMM: Estimation and TestingThe Stata Journal, 3
-
(1999)
Understanding the Determinants of Managerial Ownership and the Link between Ownership and Performance -
V. Dimitrov, Prem Jain (2004)
Recapitalization of One Class of Common Stock into Dual-Class: Growth and Long-Run Stock ReturnsMcDonough: Accounting (Topic)
-
K. Lehn, Jeffry Netter, A. Poulsen (1990)
Consolidating corporate control*1: Dual-class recapitalizations versus leveraged buyoutsJournal of Financial Economics, 27
-
Karl Lins (2002)
Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging MarketsJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38
-
M. Partch (1987)
The creation of a class of limited voting common stock and shareholder wealthJournal of Financial Economics, 18
-
H. DeAngelo, L. Deangelo (1985)
Managerial ownership of voting rights: A study of public corporations with dual classes of common stock☆Journal of Financial Economics, 14
-
Bruce Seifert, H. Gonenc, Jim Wright (2005)
The International Evidence on Performance and Equity Ownership by Insiders, Blockholders, and InstitutionsEuropean Financial Management Association Meetings (EFMA) (Archive)
-
René Stulz (1988)
Managerial control of voting rights: Financing policies and the market for corporate controlJournal of Financial Economics, 20
-
S. Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph Fan, Larry Lang (2002)
Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large ShareholdingsJournal of Finance, 57
-
Sanford Grossman, O. Hart (1987)
One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate ControlCGN: Other Corporate Governance: Acquisitions
-
Ronald Lease, John Mcconnell, W. Mikkelson (1983)
The market value of control in publicly-traded corporationsJournal of Financial Economics, 11
-
R. Morck, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny (1988)
Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical AnalysisJournal of Financial Economics, 20
-
Ronald Masulis, Cong Wang, Feixue Xie (2007)
Corporate Governance and Acquirer ReturnsLSN: Empirical Studies (Topic)
-
Scott Smart, Ramabhadran Thirumalai, C. Zutter (2006)
What's in a Vote? The Short- and Long-Run Impact of Dual-Class Equity on IPO Firm ValuesIndian School of Business Research Paper Series
-
(2003)
Dual-Class Stock, Firm Value, and Performance, working paper -
D. Andrews (1993)
Exactly Median-Unbiased Estimation of First Order Autoregressive/Unit Root ModelsEconometrica, 61
-
Ronald Lease, John Mcconnell, W. Mikkelson (1984)
The Market Value of Differential Voting Rights in Closely Held CorporationsThe Journal of Business, 57
-
S. Thompson (2009)
Simple Formulas for Standard Errors that Cluster by Both Firm and TimeCorporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies
-
J. Coles, M. Lemmon, Felix Meschke (2003)
Structural Models and Endogeneity in Corporate Finance: The Link Between Managerial Ownership and Corporate PerformanceEconometrics eJournal
-
J. Chi (2005)
Understanding the Endogeneity between Firm Value and Shareholder RightsCorporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies
-
I. Coates (2001)
Explaining Variation in Takeover: Defenses Blame the LawyersCalifornia Law Review, 89
-
V. Rosenbaum (2004)
Corporate takeover defenses -
Mark Grinblatt, S. Titman (1992)
The Persistence of Mutual Fund PerformanceJournal of Finance, 47
-
Tarun Chordia, Sahn-Wook Huh, A. Subrahmanyam (2007)
The Cross-Section of Expected Trading ActivityCapital Markets: Market Microstructure
-
H. Demsetz, K. Lehn (1985)
The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and ConsequencesJournal of Political Economy, 93
-
Ruediger Fahlenbrach (2009)
Shareholder Rights, Boards, and CEO Compensation*Review of Finance, 13
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Copyright
- © The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org.
- Subject
- Article
- ISSN
- 0893-9454
- eISSN
- 1465-7368
- DOI
- 10.1093/rfs/hhp024
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
We construct a comprehensive list of dual-class firms in the United States and use this list to analyze the relationship between insider ownership and firm value. Our data have two useful features. First, since dual-class stock separates cash-flow rights from voting rights, we can separately identify the impact of each. Second, we address endogeneity concerns by using exogenous predictors of dual-class status as instruments. In single-stage regressions, we find strong evidence that firm value is increasing in insiders’ cash-flow rights and decreasing in insider voting rights. In instrumental variable regressions, the point estimates are similar but the significance levels are lower.
Journal
The Review of Financial Studies – Oxford University Press
Published: Mar 2, 2010
Keywords: JEL Classification G32 G34