Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
D. Hambrick, E. Jackson (2000)
Outside Directors with a Stake: The Linchpin in Improving GovernanceCalifornia Management Review, 42
M. Jensen (1999)
Eclipse of the Public CorporationSPGMI: Compustat Fundamentals (Topic)
W. Lewellen, C. Loderer, K. Martin (1987)
Executive Compensation Contracts and Executive Inventive Problems: An Empirical AnalysisJournal of Accounting and Economics, 9
S. Bryan, L. Hwang, S. Lilien (2000)
CEO Stock-Based Compensation: An Empirical Analysis of Incentive-Intensity, Relative Mix, and Economic DeterminantsJournal of Business, 73
J. Core, W. Guay (1999)
The Use of Equity Grants to Manage Optimal Equity Incentive LevelsSPGMI: Compustat Fundamentals (Topic)
J. Core, Robert Holthausen, D. Larcker (1999)
Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance 1 The financial supJournal of Financial Economics
Clifford Smith, R. Watts (1992)
The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend, and Compensation PoliciesJournal of Financial Economics, 32
S. Finkelstein, D. Hambrick (1989)
Chief executive compensation: A study of the intersection of markets and political processesSouthern Medical Journal, 10
J. Gaver, K. Gaver (1993)
Additional Evidence on the Association between the Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend, and Compensation PoliciesJournal of Accounting and Economics, 16
Hamid Mehran (1995)
Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performanceJournal of Financial Economics, 38
D. Yermack (1994)
Do Corporations Award CEO Stock Options EffectivelyLabor: Personnel Economics
Richard Lambert, D. Larcker, K. Weigelt (1993)
The Structure of Organizational IncentivesAdministrative Science Quarterly, 38
Jennifer Gaver, K. Gaver (1993)
Additional evidence on the association between the investment opportunity set and corporateJournal of Accounting and Economics, 16
S. Finkelstein, D. Hambrick (1989)
Chief Executive Compensation: A Study of the Intersection of Markets and Political ProcessesStrategic Management Journal, 10
H. White (1980)
A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for HeteroskedasticityEconometrica, 48
J. Core, R. Holthausen, D. Larcker (1999)
Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm PerformanceJournal of Financial Economics, 51
Mathew Hayward, D. Hambrick (1997)
Explaining the Premiums Paid for Large Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO HubrisAdministrative Science Quarterly, 42
S. Bryan, Lee-Seok Hwang, Steven Lilien (2000)
CEO Stock-Based Compensation: An Empirical Analysis of Incentive-Intensity, Relative Mix, and Economic DeterminantsS&P Global Market Intelligence Research Paper Series
William Baber, Surya Janakiraman, Sok-Hyon Kang (1996)
Investment opportunities and the structure of executive compensationJournal of Accounting and Economics, 21
Sanjay Kallapur, Mark Trombley (1999)
The Association Between Investment Opportunity Set Proxies and Realized GrowthJournal of Business Finance & Accounting, 26
E. Fama, M. Jensen (1983)
Separation of Ownership and ControlThe Journal of Law and Economics, 26
M. Jensen (1993)
The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control SystemsCGA: Governance & Internal Control Systems (Topic)
Wilbur Lewellen, Claudio Loderer, Kenneth Martin (1987)
Executive compensation and executive incentive problems: an empirical analysisJournal of Accounting and Economics, 9
K. Eisenhardt (1989)
Agency Theory: An Assessment and ReviewAcademy of Management Review, 14
Governance scholars argue that outside directors have little incentive to monitor managers when their equity stake in the firm is not significant. A sample with a substantial level of outside director shareholdings is examined and a negative relationship between incentive compensation and outside director stock ownership is found. While firms pay higher incentive compensation when they have greater investment opportunities, the compensation contains excess pay due to ineffective corporate governance. Overall, the results suggest more effective corporate governance and lower incentive compensation when outside director stock ownership is higher.
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting – Springer Journals
Published: Oct 13, 2004
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.