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The Invented Reality: How Do We Know What We Believe We Know? (Contributions to Constructivism)

The Invented Reality: How Do We Know What We Believe We Know? (Contributions to Constructivism) Paul Watzlawick (Ed. ), New York , W.W. Norton & Co. , 1984 , 347 pp. $19.95 cloth . I. Our struggle with the question “How do we know what we know?” is often the pursuit of absolute or objective knowledge. To this end, “fundamentalist” epistemologies may offer secular salvation with the same dogmatic certainty as fundamentalist religions offer eternal salvation. Watzlawick's The Invented Reality is a collection of essays arguing for a retreat from epistemological and ideological fundamentalism. Each essay reveals the indefensibility and danger of believing in objective truth. Unfortunately, his central idea (i.e., the impossibility of attaining objective knowledge) is so embedded in each author's particular philosophical, theoretical, or political turf that the reader can easily miss it. The reader must grasp and retain the reasons why objectivity is indefensible as he or she simultaneously wrestles with the complexities of Piaget, the history of philosophy, cybernetics, the problem of causality, the complexities of the Soviet state, mathematics, logic, paradox, neurophysiology, and so on. Watzlawick's four commentaries and his concluding epilogue ought to, but somehow fail to, underline the problem associated with objective truth. The Invented Reality was published in German in 1981. Six of the http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Family Process Wiley

The Invented Reality: How Do We Know What We Believe We Know? (Contributions to Constructivism)

Family Process , Volume 24 (2) – Jun 1, 1985

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References (4)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
Copyright © 1985 Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company
ISSN
0014-7370
eISSN
1545-5300
DOI
10.1111/j.1545-5300.1985.281_6.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Paul Watzlawick (Ed. ), New York , W.W. Norton & Co. , 1984 , 347 pp. $19.95 cloth . I. Our struggle with the question “How do we know what we know?” is often the pursuit of absolute or objective knowledge. To this end, “fundamentalist” epistemologies may offer secular salvation with the same dogmatic certainty as fundamentalist religions offer eternal salvation. Watzlawick's The Invented Reality is a collection of essays arguing for a retreat from epistemological and ideological fundamentalism. Each essay reveals the indefensibility and danger of believing in objective truth. Unfortunately, his central idea (i.e., the impossibility of attaining objective knowledge) is so embedded in each author's particular philosophical, theoretical, or political turf that the reader can easily miss it. The reader must grasp and retain the reasons why objectivity is indefensible as he or she simultaneously wrestles with the complexities of Piaget, the history of philosophy, cybernetics, the problem of causality, the complexities of the Soviet state, mathematics, logic, paradox, neurophysiology, and so on. Watzlawick's four commentaries and his concluding epilogue ought to, but somehow fail to, underline the problem associated with objective truth. The Invented Reality was published in German in 1981. Six of the

Journal

Family ProcessWiley

Published: Jun 1, 1985

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