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Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings

Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings ABSTRACT This article disentangles the incentive and entrenchment effects of large ownership. Using data for 1,301 publicly traded corporations in eight East Asian economies, we find that firm value increases with the cash‐flow ownership of the largest shareholder, consistent with a positive incentive effect. But firm value falls when the control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash‐flow ownership, consistent with an entrenchment effect. Given that concentrated corporate ownership is predominant in most countries, these findings have relevance for corporate governance across the world. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Journal of Finance Wiley

Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings

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References (28)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
© American Finance Association
ISSN
0022-1082
eISSN
1540-6261
DOI
10.1111/1540-6261.00511
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

ABSTRACT This article disentangles the incentive and entrenchment effects of large ownership. Using data for 1,301 publicly traded corporations in eight East Asian economies, we find that firm value increases with the cash‐flow ownership of the largest shareholder, consistent with a positive incentive effect. But firm value falls when the control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash‐flow ownership, consistent with an entrenchment effect. Given that concentrated corporate ownership is predominant in most countries, these findings have relevance for corporate governance across the world.

Journal

The Journal of FinanceWiley

Published: Dec 1, 2002

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