Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
(1999)
A tbeory of pyramidal structures, Manuscript, Harvard University
M. Harris, A. Raviv (1988)
Corporate governance: Voting rights and majority rulesJournal of Financial Economics, 20
Claessens Claessens, Simeon Simeon, Larry Larry (2000)
The separation of ownership andcontrol in East Asian corporationsJournal of Financial Economics, 58
Joseph Fan, S. Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Larry Lang (1999)
Expropriation of Minority Shareholders: Evidence from East Asia
S. Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph Fan, Larry Lang (2001)
The Pattern and Valuation Effects of Corporate Diversification: A Comparison of the United States, Japan, and other East Asian Economies
T. Breusch, A. Pagan (1980)
The Lagrange Multiplier Test and its Applications to Model Specification in EconometricsThe Review of Economic Studies, 47
Tatiana Nenova (2000)
The Value of Corporate Votes and Control Benefits: A Cross-Country AnalysisCorporate Finance and Organizations eJournal
René Stulz (1988)
Managerial control of voting rights: Financing policies and the market for corporate controlJournal of Financial Economics, 20
B. Olivier (1994)
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer., 36
Sanford Grossman, O. Hart (1987)
One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate ControlCGN: Other Corporate Governance: Acquisitions
R. Porta, Florencio Silanes, Andrei Shleifer (1998)
Corporate Ownership Around the WorldCorporate Finance and Organizations eJournal
R. Morck, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny (1988)
Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical AnalysisJournal of Financial Economics, 20
R. Morck, David Stangeland, B. Yeung (1998)
Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control and Economic Growth: the Canadian DiseaseDevelopment Economics
S. Claessens, Joseph Fan, Simeon Djankov, Larry Lang (1998)
Diversification and Efficiency of Investment of East Asian CorporationsDiversification Strategy & Policy eJournal
John Mcconnell, H. Servaes (1990)
Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate valueJournal of Financial Economics, 27
R. Morck (2000)
Concentrated Corporate Ownership
L. Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman, George Triantis (1999)
Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash Flow RightsCorporate Law: Finance & Corporate Governance Law eJournal
Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny (1996)
A Survey of Corporate GovernanceOrganizations & Markets eJournal
La Porta La Porta, Florencio Florencio, Andrei Andrei (1999)
Corporate ownershiparound the worldJournal of Finance, 54
R. Porta, Florencio Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny (1999)
Investor Protection and Corporate ValuationChicago Booth: Fama-Miller Working Paper Series
Simon Johnson, Peter Boone, A. Breach, E. Friedman (2000)
Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial CrisisJournal of Financial Economics, 58
(2000)
Theory of the Firm : Managerial Behavior , Agency Costs and Ownership Structure
J. Campbell (1993)
Understanding Risk and ReturnJournal of Political Economy, 104
Shleifer Shleifer, Robert Robert (1997)
A survey of corporate governanceJournal of Finance, 52
R. Porta, Florencio Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny (1999)
Investor Protection and Corporate GovernanceChicago Booth: Fama-Miller Working Paper Series
Simon Johnson, A. Breach, E. Friedman (1998)
Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis 1997-98
L. Bebchuk (1999)
A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and ControlLaw & Economics eJournal
S. Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Larry Lang (1999)
The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian CorporationsCorporate Finance and Organizations eJournal
ABSTRACT This article disentangles the incentive and entrenchment effects of large ownership. Using data for 1,301 publicly traded corporations in eight East Asian economies, we find that firm value increases with the cash‐flow ownership of the largest shareholder, consistent with a positive incentive effect. But firm value falls when the control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash‐flow ownership, consistent with an entrenchment effect. Given that concentrated corporate ownership is predominant in most countries, these findings have relevance for corporate governance across the world.
The Journal of Finance – Wiley
Published: Dec 1, 2002
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.