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- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2010 by the American Economic Association
- Subject
- Articles
- ISSN
- 0002-8282
- DOI
- 10.1257/aer.100.3.724
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Abstract This paper examines bidding in over 1,700 knockout auctions used by a bidding cartel (or ring) of stamp dealers in the 1990s. The knockout was conducted using a variant of the model studied by Daniel Graham, Robert Marshall, and Jean-Francois Richard (1990). Following a reduced form examination of these data, damages, induced inefficiency, and the ring's benefit from colluding are estimated using a structural model in the spirit of Emmanuel Guerre, Isabelle Perrigne, and Quang Vuong (2000). A notable finding is that nonring bidders suffered damages that were of the same order of magnitude as those of the sellers. (JEL D43, D44, L12 )
Journal
American Economic Review – American Economic Association
Published: Jun 1, 2010