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Selling Spectrum Rights

Selling Spectrum Rights Abstract The design of the FCC spectrum-license auction is a case study in the application of economic theory. Auction theory helped address policy questions such as: Should an open auction or a sealed-bid auction be used? Should the licenses be auctioned sequentially or simultaneously? Should the government allow bids for combinations of licenses, or should it accept only single-license bids? How should the auction be structured to promote the interests of minority-owned and other designated firms? Should the government impose royalties or reserve prices? How much should the bidders be informed about their competition? http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Economic Perspectives American Economic Association

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References (45)

Publisher
American Economic Association
Copyright
Copyright © 1994 by the American Economic Association
Subject
Articles
ISSN
0895-3309
DOI
10.1257/jep.8.3.145
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract The design of the FCC spectrum-license auction is a case study in the application of economic theory. Auction theory helped address policy questions such as: Should an open auction or a sealed-bid auction be used? Should the licenses be auctioned sequentially or simultaneously? Should the government allow bids for combinations of licenses, or should it accept only single-license bids? How should the auction be structured to promote the interests of minority-owned and other designated firms? Should the government impose royalties or reserve prices? How much should the bidders be informed about their competition?

Journal

Journal of Economic PerspectivesAmerican Economic Association

Published: Aug 1, 1994

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