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FCC Adopts Rules to Implement Competitive Bidding to Award Spectrum Licenses
Abstract The design of the FCC spectrum-license auction is a case study in the application of economic theory. Auction theory helped address policy questions such as: Should an open auction or a sealed-bid auction be used? Should the licenses be auctioned sequentially or simultaneously? Should the government allow bids for combinations of licenses, or should it accept only single-license bids? How should the auction be structured to promote the interests of minority-owned and other designated firms? Should the government impose royalties or reserve prices? How much should the bidders be informed about their competition?
Journal of Economic Perspectives – American Economic Association
Published: Aug 1, 1994
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