Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Loading next page...
/lp/wiley/institutional-holdings-and-payout-policy-cM203dkFoP
References (27)
-
Stephens Stephens, Weisbach Weisbach (1998)
Actual share reacquisitions in open market repurchases programsJournal of Finance, 53
-
Allen Allen, Bernardo Bernardo, Welch Welch (2000)
A theory of dividends based on tax clientelesJournal of Finance, 55
-
Grullon Grullon, Michaely Michaely, Swaminathan Swaminathan (2002)
Are dividend changes a sign of firm maturity?Journal of Business, 75
-
Brav Brav, Graham Graham, Harvey Harvey, Michaely Michaely (2005)
Payout policy in the 21 st centuryThe Journal of Financial Economics
-
Jensen Jensen (1986)
Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeoversAmerican Economic Review, 76
-
Holtz‐Eakin Holtz‐Eakin, Newey Newey, Rosen Rosen (1988)
Estimating vector autoregressions with panel dataEconometrica, 56
-
Allen (2000)
2499Journal of Finance, 55
-
Grullon Grullon, Michaely Michaely (2002)
Dividends, repurchases, and the substitution hypothesisJournal of Finance, 57
-
Michaely Michaely, Shaw Shaw (1994)
The pricing of initial public offerings: Tests of the adverse selection and signaling theoriesReview of Financial Studies, 7
-
Townsend Townsend (1979)
Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verificationJournal of Economic Theory, 21
-
Fama Fama, French French (2001)
Disappearing dividends: Changing firm characteristics or lower propensity to pay?Journal of Financial Economics, 60
-
Benartzi Benartzi, Michaely Michaely, Thaler Thaler (1997)
Do changes in dividends signal the future or the pastJournal of Finance, 52
-
Diamond Diamond (1984)
Financial intermediation and delegated monitoringReview of Economic Studies, 51
-
Michaely Michaely, Thaler Thaler, Womack Womack (1995)
Price reactions to dividend initiations and omissions: Overreaction or drift?Journal of Finance, 50
-
Roe Roe (1997)
The political roots of American corporate financeJournal of Applied Corporate Finance, 9
-
Carleton Carleton, Nelson Nelson, Weisbach Weisbach (1998)
The influence of institutions on corporate governance through private negotiations: Evidence from TIAA‐CREFJournal of Finance, 53
-
Del Guercio Del Guercio (1996)
The distorting effect of the prudent‐man laws on institutional equity investmentsJournal of Financial Economics, 40
-
Barclay Barclay, Smith Smith (1988)
Corporate payout policy: Cash dividends versus open‐market repurchasesJournal of Financial Economics, 22
-
Fama Fama, French French (1997)
Industry costs of equityJournal of Financial Economics, 43
-
Gompers Gompers, Metrick Metrick (2001)
Institutional investors and equity pricesThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116
-
Grossman Grossman, Hart Hart (1980)
Takeover bids, the free‐rider problem, and the theory of the corporationBell Journal of Economics, 11
-
Gillan Gillan, Starks Starks (2000)
Corporate governance proposals and shareholder activism: The role of institutional investorsJournal of Financial Economics, 57
-
Gale Gale, Hellwig Hellwig (1985)
Incentive‐compatible debt contracts: The one‐period problemReview of Economic Studies, 52
-
Brennan Brennan, Thakor Thakor (1990)
Shareholder preferences and dividend policyJournal of Finance, 45
-
Hotchkiss Hotchkiss, Strickland Strickland (2003)
Does shareholder composition matter? Evidence from the market reaction to corporate earnings announcementsJournal of Finance, 58
-
Shleifer Shleifer, Vishny Vishny (1986)
Large shareholders and corporate controlJournal of Political Economy, 94
-
Hartzell Hartzell, Starks Starks (2003)
Institutional investors and executive compensationJournal of Finance, 58
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- © American Finance Association
- ISSN
- 0022-1082
- eISSN
- 1540-6261
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00765.x
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
ABSTRACT We examine the relation between institutional holdings and payout policy in U.S. public firms. We find that payout policy affects institutional holdings. Institutions avoid firms that do not pay dividends. However, among dividend‐paying firms they prefer firms that pay fewer dividends. Our evidence indicates that institutions prefer firms that repurchase shares, and regular repurchasers over nonregular repurchasers. Higher institutional holdings or a concentration of holdings do not cause firms to increase their dividends, their repurchases, or their total payout. Our results do not support models that predict that high dividends attract institutional clientele, or models that predict that institutions cause firms to increase payout.
Journal
The Journal of Finance – Wiley
Published: Jun 1, 2005