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- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- 1991 The American Finance Association
- ISSN
- 0022-1082
- eISSN
- 1540-6261
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb02679.x
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
ABSTRACT This paper examines the hypothesis that an important role of corporate takeovers is to discipline the top managers of poorly performing target firms. We document that the turnover rate for the top manager of target firms in tender offer‐takeovers significantly increases following completion of the takeover and that prior to the takeover these firms were significantly under‐performing other firms in their industry as well as other target firms which had no post‐takeover change in the top executive. We interpret the results to indicate that the takeover market plays an important role in controlling the nonvalue maximizing behavior of top corporate managers.
Journal
The Journal of Finance – Wiley
Published: Jun 1, 1991