Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
D. Strassmann (1990)
Potential Competition in the Deregulated AirlinesThe Review of Economics and Statistics, 72
(2005)
Introductory Economics: A Modern Approach (3rd edition) (Thompson Learning, SouthWestern College Publishing, Cincinnati, Ohio)
Werden Werden, Joskow Joskow, Johnson Johnson (1991)
The Effects of Mergers on Price and OutputManagerial and Decision Economics, 12
S. Borenstein (1992)
The Evolution of U.S. Airline CompetitionJournal of Economic Perspectives, 6
E. Kim, Vijay Singal (1993)
Mergers and Market Power: Evidence from the Airline IndustryThe American Economic Review, 83
(2008)
Eliminating Potential Competition
Gloria Hurdle (1989)
Concentration, potential entry, and performance in the airline industry.Journal of Industrial Economics, 38
(2008)
Eliminating PotentialCompetition,’ Collins,WayneDale (ed.) Issues in Competition Law and Policy (American Bar Association, Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.)
Martin Pesendorfer (1998)
Horizontal Mergers in the Paper IndustryNBER Working Paper Series
Kwoka Kwoka (2001)
Non‐Incumbent CompetitionCase Western Law Review, 52
S. Kole, K. Lehn (1997)
Workforce Integration and the Dissipation of Value in Mergers: The Case of USAir's Acquisition of Piedmont Aviation
Kai Konrad (2003)
Opinion Leaders, Influence Activities and Leadership RentsMicroeconomic Theory eJournal
J. Brueckner, P. Spiller (1994)
Economies of Traffic Density in the Deregulated Airline IndustryThe Journal of Law and Economics, 37
S. Borenstein (1990)
Airline Mergers, Airport Dominance, and Market PowerThe American Economic Review, 80
M. Bergman (2002)
Potential competition : theory empirical evidence and legal practice
Gustavo Bamberger, D. Carlton, Lynette Neumann (2001)
An Empirical Investigation of the Competitive Effects of Domestic Airline Alliances*The Journal of Law and Economics, 47
Morrison Morrison (2001)
Actual, Adjacent and Potential CompetitionJournal of Transport Economics and Policy, 35
Pesendorfer Pesendorfer (2003)
Horizontal Mergers in the Paper IndustryRand Journal of Economics, 34
S. Morrison, C. Winston (1987)
Empirical Implications and Tests of the Contestability HypothesisThe Journal of Law and Economics, 30
S. Morrison (2001)
Actual, Adjacent, and Potential Competition Estimating the Full Effect of Southwest AirlinesJournal of Transport Economics and Policy, 35
Morrison Morrison (1996)
Airline MergersJournal of Transport Economics and Policy, 30
Peters Peters (2006)
Evaluating the Performance of Merger StimulationJournal of Law & Economics, 49
G. Werden, A. Joskow, Richard Johnson (1991)
The effects of mergers on price and output: Two case studies from the airline industryManagerial and Decision Economics, 12
Gugler Gugler, Mueller Mueller, Yurtoglu Yurtoglu, Zulehner Zulehner (2003)
The Effects of MergersInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 21
R. Willig (2011)
Unilateral Competitive Effects of Mergers: Upward Pricing Pressure, Product Quality, and Other ExtensionsReview of Industrial Organization, 39
(2008)
The Price Effect of Eliminating Potential Competition : Evidence from an Airline Merger
Kim Kim, Singal Singal (1993)
Mergers and Market PowerAmerican Economic Review, 83
C. Peters (2003)
Evaluating the Performance of Merger Simulation: Evidence from the U.S. Airline IndustryIO: Regulation
(2005)
How Do Incumbents Respond to the Threat of Entry? Evidence from the Major Airlines,
John Kwoka (2001)
Non-Incumbent Competition: Mergers Involving Constraining and Prospective CompetitorsCase Western Reserve law review, 52
S. Morrison (1996)
AIRLINE MERGERS: A LONGER VIEWJournal of Transport Economics and Policy, 30
James Reitzes, Brendan Mcveigh, N. Powers, Samuel Moy (2011)
Competitive Effects of Exchanges or Sales of Airport Landing SlotsReview of Industrial Organization, 46
P. Reiss, P. Spiller (1989)
Competition and Entry in Small Airline MarketsThe Journal of Law and Economics, 32
This paper analyzes the gain in pricing power that a firm achieves by merging with a potential competitor in its market. Using pricing data for the merger of USAir and Piedmont, empirical analysis finds that prices rose by 5.0 to 6.0 per cent on routes that one carrier served and the other was a potential entrant. This was more than half the increase on routes where the two carriers had been direct competitors. Other important factors included carrier size, market concentration, incumbent's identity and the potential entrant's presence at one or both endpoints.
The Journal of Industrial Economics – Wiley
Published: Dec 1, 2010
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.