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- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2005 Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company
- ISSN
- 0021-8456
- eISSN
- 1475-679X
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1475-679X.2005.00178.x
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
ABSTRACT Accounting measurements of firms' investments are usually imprecise. We study the economic consequences of such imprecision when it interacts with information asymmetry regarding an investment project's ex ante profitability, known only by the firm's managers. Absent agency and risk‐sharing considerations, we find that some degree of accounting imprecision could actually be value enhancing. We characterize the optimal degree of imprecision and identify its key determinants. The greater the information asymmetry regarding the project's profitability, the greater is the imprecision that should be tolerated in the measurement of the firm's investment.
Journal
Journal of Accounting Research – Wiley
Published: Jun 1, 2005