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Favorable versus Unfavorable Recommendations: The Impact on Analyst Access to Management‐Provided Information

Favorable versus Unfavorable Recommendations: The Impact on Analyst Access to Management‐Provided... ABSTRACT This study examines recent regulatory and practitioner concerns that managers provide more (less) information to analysts with more (less) favorable stock recommendations. We examine the relative forecast accuracy of analysts before and after a recommendation issuance under the assumption that increases (decreases) in management‐provided information will increase (decrease) analysts' relative forecast accuracy. We find that analysts issuing more favorable recommendations experience a greater increase in their relative forecast accuracy compared with analysts with less favorable recommendations. Additional tests on the change in frequency with which analysts issue forecasts independent of or in conjunction with other analysts after their recommendation change yield corroborating results. In addition, we find that the greater increase in relative accuracy for analysts with more favorable recommendations exists prior to the passage of Regulation FD but not after. The combined results are consistent with analysts receiving relatively more management‐provided information following the issuance of more favorable recommendations. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Accounting Research Wiley

Favorable versus Unfavorable Recommendations: The Impact on Analyst Access to Management‐Provided Information

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References (27)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
Copyright © 2006 Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company
ISSN
0021-8456
eISSN
1475-679X
DOI
10.1111/j.1475-679X.2006.00217.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

ABSTRACT This study examines recent regulatory and practitioner concerns that managers provide more (less) information to analysts with more (less) favorable stock recommendations. We examine the relative forecast accuracy of analysts before and after a recommendation issuance under the assumption that increases (decreases) in management‐provided information will increase (decrease) analysts' relative forecast accuracy. We find that analysts issuing more favorable recommendations experience a greater increase in their relative forecast accuracy compared with analysts with less favorable recommendations. Additional tests on the change in frequency with which analysts issue forecasts independent of or in conjunction with other analysts after their recommendation change yield corroborating results. In addition, we find that the greater increase in relative accuracy for analysts with more favorable recommendations exists prior to the passage of Regulation FD but not after. The combined results are consistent with analysts receiving relatively more management‐provided information following the issuance of more favorable recommendations.

Journal

Journal of Accounting ResearchWiley

Published: Sep 1, 2006

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