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Informational Regulation of Environmental Risks

Informational Regulation of Environmental Risks This paper examines the law and economics of informational regulation (IR) of environmental risks. Informational regulation here means regulation which provides to affected stakeholders information on the operations of regulated entities, usually with the expectation that such stakeholders will then exert pressure on these entities to comply with regulations in a manner which serves the interests of stakeholders. As such, IR reinforces and augments direct regulatory monitoring and enforcement through third‐party monitoring and incentives. The paper provides two contrasting frameworks, from law and economics, to analyze the costs and benefits likely to arise from IR and concludes with a discussion of the appropriate scope of IR as a substitute for and complement of traditional environmental regulation and law. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Risk Analysis Wiley

Informational Regulation of Environmental Risks

Kleindorfer, Paul R.; Orts, Eric W.
Risk Analysis , Volume 18 (2) – Apr 1, 1998
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References (62)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
Copyright © 1998 Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company
ISSN
0272-4332
eISSN
1539-6924
DOI
10.1111/j.1539-6924.1998.tb00927.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This paper examines the law and economics of informational regulation (IR) of environmental risks. Informational regulation here means regulation which provides to affected stakeholders information on the operations of regulated entities, usually with the expectation that such stakeholders will then exert pressure on these entities to comply with regulations in a manner which serves the interests of stakeholders. As such, IR reinforces and augments direct regulatory monitoring and enforcement through third‐party monitoring and incentives. The paper provides two contrasting frameworks, from law and economics, to analyze the costs and benefits likely to arise from IR and concludes with a discussion of the appropriate scope of IR as a substitute for and complement of traditional environmental regulation and law.

Journal

Risk Analysis – Wiley

Published: Apr 1, 1998

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