Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Manager‐Specific Effects on Earnings Guidance: An Analysis of Top Executive Turnovers

Manager‐Specific Effects on Earnings Guidance: An Analysis of Top Executive Turnovers ABSTRACT We investigate how managers contribute to the provision of earnings guidance by examining the association between top executive turnovers and guidance. Although firm and industry characteristics are important determinants of guidance, we conclude that CEOs participate in firm‐level policy decisions, whereas CFOs are involved in the formation or discussion of guidance. Among firms that historically issued frequent guidance, breaks in guidance following CEO turnovers are relatively permanent and are potentially attributable to firm‐initiated changes in guidance policy. Breaks following CFO turnovers, however, likely reflect uncertainty on the part of the newly appointed executive—they are concentrated in the two quarters following the turnover, are associated with the background of the newly appointed CFO, and extend to the relative precision of the guidance. Among firms that did not issue guidance historically, we find some evidence that newly appointed externally hired CEOs increase the likelihood of providing guidance. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Accounting Research Wiley

Manager‐Specific Effects on Earnings Guidance: An Analysis of Top Executive Turnovers

Loading next page...
 
/lp/wiley/manager-specific-effects-on-earnings-guidance-an-analysis-of-top-VgUhhMvp1F

References (73)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
©, University of Chicago on behalf of the Accounting Research Center, 2011
ISSN
0021-8456
eISSN
1475-679X
DOI
10.1111/j.1475-679X.2011.00420.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

ABSTRACT We investigate how managers contribute to the provision of earnings guidance by examining the association between top executive turnovers and guidance. Although firm and industry characteristics are important determinants of guidance, we conclude that CEOs participate in firm‐level policy decisions, whereas CFOs are involved in the formation or discussion of guidance. Among firms that historically issued frequent guidance, breaks in guidance following CEO turnovers are relatively permanent and are potentially attributable to firm‐initiated changes in guidance policy. Breaks following CFO turnovers, however, likely reflect uncertainty on the part of the newly appointed executive—they are concentrated in the two quarters following the turnover, are associated with the background of the newly appointed CFO, and extend to the relative precision of the guidance. Among firms that did not issue guidance historically, we find some evidence that newly appointed externally hired CEOs increase the likelihood of providing guidance.

Journal

Journal of Accounting ResearchWiley

Published: Dec 1, 2011

There are no references for this article.