Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Loading next page...
/lp/wiley/disclosure-decisions-by-firms-and-the-competition-for-price-efficiency-VTV9m4vAW6
References (14)
-
R. Merton (1987)
Presidential Address: A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information -
Michael Fishman, K. Hagerty (1990)
The Optimal Amount of Discretion to Allow in DisclosureQuarterly Journal of Economics, 105
-
A. Kyle (1985)
Continuous Auctions and Insider TradingEconometrica, 53
-
R. Dye (1990)
Mandatory vs. Voluntary Disclosures: The Cases of Financial and Real ExternalitiesThe Accounting Review
-
F. Easterbrook, D. Fischel (1984)
Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of InvestorsVirginia Law Review, 70
-
E. Fama, A. Laffer (1971)
Information and Capital MarketsThe Journal of Business, 44
-
Verrecchia Verrecchia (1983)
Discretionary disclosureJournal of Accounting and Economics, 5
-
Hakansson Hakansson (1977)
Interim disclosure and public forecasts: An economic analysis and a framework for choiceAccounting Review, 52
-
Merton Merton (1987)
A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete informationJournal of Finance, 42
-
A. Kyle (1984)
Market structure, information, futures markets, and price formation. -
Douglas Diamond (1985)
Optimal Release of Information By FirmsJournal of Finance, 40
-
J. Hirshleifer (1971)
The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive ActivityThe American Economic Review, 61
-
Anat Admati, P. Pfleiderer (1988)
A Theory of Intraday Patterns: Volume and Price VariabilityReview of Financial Studies, 1
-
Sanford Grossman, O. Hart (1983)
Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- 1989 The American Finance Association
- ISSN
- 0022-1082
- eISSN
- 1540-6261
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1989.tb04382.x
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
ABSTRACT This paper develops a model of the relationship between investment decisions by firms and the efficiency of the market prices of their securities. It is shown that more efficient security prices can lead to more efficient investment decisions. This provides firms with the incentive to increase price efficiency by voluntarily disclosing information about the firm. Disclosure decisions are studied. It is shown that firms may expend more resources on disclosure than is socially optimal. This is in contrast to the concern implicit in mandatory disclosure rules that firms will expend too few resources on disclosure.
Journal
The Journal of Finance – Wiley
Published: Jul 1, 1989