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Disclosure Quality and Management Trading Incentives

Disclosure Quality and Management Trading Incentives ABSTRACT This study examines whether managers strategically alter disclosure “quality” in response to personal incentives, specifically those derived from trading on their own account. Using changes in market liquidity to proxy for disclosure quality, I find that trading incentives are associated with disclosure quality choices. Tests are performed across three disclosure samples: management forecasts, conference calls, and press releases. Consistent with a desire to reduce the probability of litigation, I find evidence that managers provide higher quality disclosures before selling shares than they provide in the absence of trading. Consistent with a desire to maintain their information advantage, I find some, albeit weaker, evidence that managers provide lower quality disclosures prior to purchasing shares than they provide in the absence of trading. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Accounting Research Wiley

Disclosure Quality and Management Trading Incentives

Journal of Accounting Research , Volume 46 (5) – Dec 1, 2008

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References (96)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
©, University of Chicago on behalf of the Institute of Professional Accounting, 2008
ISSN
0021-8456
eISSN
1475-679X
DOI
10.1111/j.1475-679X.2008.00308.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

ABSTRACT This study examines whether managers strategically alter disclosure “quality” in response to personal incentives, specifically those derived from trading on their own account. Using changes in market liquidity to proxy for disclosure quality, I find that trading incentives are associated with disclosure quality choices. Tests are performed across three disclosure samples: management forecasts, conference calls, and press releases. Consistent with a desire to reduce the probability of litigation, I find evidence that managers provide higher quality disclosures before selling shares than they provide in the absence of trading. Consistent with a desire to maintain their information advantage, I find some, albeit weaker, evidence that managers provide lower quality disclosures prior to purchasing shares than they provide in the absence of trading.

Journal

Journal of Accounting ResearchWiley

Published: Dec 1, 2008

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