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I exploit a new station‐level, twelve‐hourly price dataset to examine the strong retail price cycles in the Toronto gasoline market. The cycles appear similar to theoretical Edgeworth Cycles: strongly asymmetric, tall, rapid, and highly synchronous across stations. I test a series of predictions made by the theory about how firm behaviors would differentially evolve over the path of a cycle. The evidence is consistent with the existence of Edgeworth Cycles and inconsistent with competing hypotheses. While the cycles are an interesting phenomenon for study in their own right, the evidence has important policy and welfare implications.
The Journal of Industrial Economics – Wiley
Published: Mar 1, 2007
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