Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Tim Loughran, J. Ritter (1995)
The New Issues PuzzleJournal of Finance, 50
Morton Pierce (1976)
Current and Recurrent Section 5 Gun-Jumping ProblemsCase Western Reserve law review, 26
Chiappinelli Chiappinelli (1989)
Gun jumping: The problem of extraneous offers of securitiesUniversity of Pittsburgh Law Review, 50
Mark Lang, Russell Lundholm (1993)
CROSS- SECTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF ANALYST RATINGS OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURESJournal of Accounting Research, 31
Lin Lin, McNichols McNichols (1998)
Underwriting relationships, analysts' earnings forecasts and investment recommendations ‐ The empirical power and specification of test statisticsJournal of Accounting and Economics, 25
H. Lin, M. McNichols (1998)
Underwriting relationships, analysts' earnings forecasts and investment recommendationsJournal of Accounting and Economics, 25
J. Francis, Donna Philbrick, K. Schipper (1994)
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURESJournal of Accounting Research, 32
Robert Korajczyk, Deborah Lucas, R. McDonald (1991)
The Effect of Information Releases on the Pricing and Timing of Equity IssuesERPN: Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) (Sub-Topic)
Longstreth Longstreth, Prager Prager (1993)
Gun jumping revisited: A proposal to prevent false starts in private offeringsSecurities Regulation Law Journal, 21
Christine Botosan (1997)
Disclosure level and the cost of equity capitalAccounting review: A quarterly journal of the American Accounting Association, 72
J. Bound, David Jaeger, Regina Baker (1993)
The Cure Can Be Worse than the Disease: A Cautionary Tale Regarding Instrumental Variables
P. Asquith, D. Mullins (1986)
Equity issues and offering dilutionJournal of Financial Economics, 15
Ewing Ewing (1999)
Quiet period ahead of IPOs has suddenly become noisyInteractive Wall Street Journal
Roni Michaely, Kent Womack (1999)
Conflict of interest and the credibility of underwriter analyst recommendationsReview of Financial Studies, 12
W. Mikkelson, M. Partch (1986)
Valuation effects of security offerings and the issuance processJournal of Financial Economics, 15
Richard Frankel, M. McNichols (1995)
Discretionary Disclosure and External FinancingAccounting review: A quarterly journal of the American Accounting Association, 70
D. Spiess, J. Affleck-Graves (1995)
Underperformance in long-run stock returns following seasoned equity offeringsJournal of Financial Economics, 38
Srinivasan Rangan (1998)
Earnings management and the performance of seasoned equity offeringsJournal of Financial Economics, 50
Amitabh Dugar, Siva Nathan (1995)
The Effect of Investment Banking Relationships on Financial Analysts' Earnings Forecasts and Investment Recommendations*Contemporary Accounting Research, 12
I. Lee (1997)
Do Firms Knowingly Sell Overvalued EquityJournal of Finance, 52
Clifford Smith (1986)
INVESTMENT BANKING AND THE CAPITAL ACQUISITION PROCESSJournal of Financial Economics, 15
P. Healy, Amy Hutton, K. Palepu (1999)
Stock Performance and Intermediation Changes Surrounding Sustained Increases in DisclosureContemporary Accounting Research, 16
Craig Dunbar, C. Hwang, Kuldeep Shastri (1997)
Underwriter Analyst Recommendations: Conflict of Interest or Rush to Judgement
Masulis Masulis, Korwar Korwar (1986)
Seasoned equity offerings: An empirical investigationJournal of Financial Economics, 15
Richardson Richardson, Reece Reece (1993)
Gun jumpingReview of Securities and Commodities Regulation, 26
Hong Siew, Teoh, I. Welch, T. Wong, Randolph Beatty, V. Bernard, K. Chan, Kent Daniel, Mark Defond, L. Field, David Heike, Yang Chuan, Jonathan Hwang, S. Karpoff, Charles Kothari, Wayne Lee, Tim Mikkelson, Krishna Opler, K. Palepu, Jay Ramesh, Terry Ritter, D. Shevlin, Sheridan Skinner, Ross Titman, J. Watts, Zimmerman (1998)
Earnings management and the underperformance of seasoned equity offeringsJournal of Financial Economics, 50
Patricia Dechow, Amy Hutton, Richard Sloan (1999)
The Relation between Analysts' Forecasts of Long-Term Earnings Growth and Stock Price Performance Following Equity OfferingsCapital Markets: Market Efficiency eJournal
(1984)
Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
Carol Marquardt, Christine Wiedman (1998)
Voluntary Disclosure, Information Asymmetry, and Insider Selling through Secondary Equity Offerings*Contemporary Accounting Research, 15
Ruland Ruland, Tung Tung, George George (1990)
Factors associated with the disclosure of managers' forecastsAccounting Review, 65
Mark Lang, Russell Lundholm (1998)
Corporate Disclosure Policy and Analyst Behavior
Ashok Korwar, Ronald Masulis (1986)
Seasoned Equity Offerings: An Empirical InvestigationCapital Markets: Market Efficiency
Pulliam Pulliam (1999)
Internet investors start to regard press releases of new products as reason to send stock soaringInteractive Wall Street Journal
We examine corporate disclosure activity around seasoned equity offerings and its relationship to stock prices. Beginning six months before the offering, our sample issuing firms dramatically increase their disclosure activity, particularly for the categories of disclosure over which firms have the most discretion. The increase is significant after controlling for the firm's current and future earnings performance and tends to be largest for firms with selling shareholders participating in the offering. However, there is no change in the frequency of forward‐looking statements prior to the equity offering, something that is expressly discouraged by the securities law. Firms that maintain a consistent level of disclosure experience price increases prior to the offering, and only minor price declines at the offering announcement relative to the control firms, suggesting that disclosure may have reduced the information asymmetry inherent in the offering. Firms that substantially increase their disclosure activity in the six months before the offering also experience price increases prior to the offering relative to the control firms, but suffer much larger price declines at the announcement of their intent to issue equity, suggesting that the disclosure increase may have been used to “hype the stock” and the market may have partially corrected for the earlier price increase. Firms that maintain a consistent disclosure level have no unusual return behavior relative to the control firms subsequent to the announcement, while the firms that “hyped” their stock continue to suffer negative returns, providing further evidence that the increased disclosure activity may have been hype, and suggesting that the hype may have been successful in lowering the firms' cost of equity capital.
Contemporary Accounting Research – Wiley
Published: Dec 1, 2000
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.