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- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- Copyright © 1997 Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company
- ISSN
- 1074-3529
- eISSN
- 1465-7287
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1465-7287.1997.tb00471.x
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
This paper examines the impact of gate revenue sharing and luxury taxes on professional sports leagues within the context of a less restrictive demand function than those used in prior models. In contrast to previous studies, the analysis finds that the increased sharing of revenues may enhance competitive balance. Consistent with other models, the analysis finds that player salaries will diminish as the percentage of shared gate receipts rises. The analysis also explores several variations of luxury taxes. All have the effect of lowering salaries. The impact on league balance depends on how the tax is implemented and on how its proceeds are distributed. As with salary caps, enforcement problems exist with the tax.
Journal
Contemporary Economic Policy – Wiley
Published: Apr 1, 1997