Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
I. Friend (1976)
Economic Foundations of Stock Market Regulation
Mark Lang, Russell Lundholm (1993)
CROSS- SECTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF ANALYST RATINGS OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURESJournal of Accounting Research, 31
(1998)
Enhanced Statutory Disclosure: Much Ado About Nothing?, working paper
Douglas Skinner (1994)
WHY FIRMS VOLUNTARILY DISCLOSE BAD-NEWSJournal of Accounting Research, 32
Donna Philbrick, W. Ricks (1991)
Using Value Line And Ibes Analyst Forecasts In Accounting ResearchJournal of Accounting Research, 29
Christine Botosan (1997)
Disclosure level and the cost of equity capitalAccounting review: A quarterly journal of the American Accounting Association, 72
Peter Clarkson, J. Kao, G. Richardson (1994)
The Voluntary Inclusion of Forecasts in the MD&A Section of Annual ReportsContemporary Accounting Research, 11
S. Peltzman (1976)
Toward a More General Theory of RegulationThe Journal of Law and Economics, 19
G. Benston (1973)
Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934The American Economic Review, 63
(1997)
Analysis, Future Earnings and Stock Prices
(1993)
Disclosures in Different Countries
P. Brown (1994)
Capital Markets-Based Research in Accounting: an Introduction
(1995)
The Voluntary Disclosure of Forecast Data by Australian IPOs, working paper
P. Healy, K. Palepu, Amy Hutton (1995)
Do Firms Benefit from Expanded Voluntary Disclosure
C. Frost (1997)
Disclosure policy choices of UK firms receiving modified audit reportsJournal of Accounting and Economics, 23
R. Jennings (1987)
Unsystematic Security Price Movements, Management Earnings Forecasts, And Revisions In Consensus Analyst Earnings ForecastsJournal of Accounting Research, 25
This article examines the effect of statutory civil and criminal sanctions on voluntary corporate disclosures by firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). Apart from direct investigation of the quantity of voluntary disclosure, we also investigate several possible consequences of altered corporate disclosure policies, namely properties of analysts’ forecasts, the degree to which share prices anticipate the information content of periodic earnings reports, and the relationship between volatility and corporate disclosures. Results suggest that, post‐sanctions, any increase in voluntary disclosure is confined to smaller firms and those which performed relatively poorly. Moreover, analysts’ earnings forecasts did not become more accurate or less diverse following the introduction of statutory sanctions, and there was no statistically significant increase in the weight placed on each disclosure’s ability to explain return volatility. There is some evidence that share prices have anticipated earlier the value relevant components of annual periodic accounting data, although this result is again confined to smaller firms. Although the tests used are not independent and have a limited time period post‐sanctions, the results cast doubt on the extent to which the imposition of substantive civil or criminal sanctions affects corporate disclosure policy.
Abacus – Wiley
Published: Jun 1, 1999
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.