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- Publisher
- World Scientific Publishing Company
- Copyright
- Copyright ©
- ISSN
- 0219-0915
- eISSN
- 1793-6705
- DOI
- 10.1142/S021909150900171X
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Firms with higher board independence, smaller boards, and lower expected managerial entrenchment, have lower cash holdings. We find that the positive association between cash holdings and managerial entrenchment is mitigated by stronger board structures. Specifically, in firms with higher expected managerial entrenchment, those with higher proportion of outside director on the board and smaller board size have lower cash holdings. We also find that firm value is negatively associated with cash levels. The negative association between firm value and cash holdings is more pronounced in firms with (i) lower proportion of outside directors, (ii) larger boards and (iii) higher expected managerial entrenchment. For firms with both high cash holdings and high expected managerial entrenchment, investors additionally discount the valuation of firms with lower proportion of outside directors and those with larger boards.
Journal
Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies – World Scientific Publishing Company
Published: Sep 1, 2009
Keywords: Cash holdings corporate governance firm performance