Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Loading next page...
/lp/oxford-university-press/the-endogeneity-of-managerial-compensation-in-firm-valuation-a-Qv5UQw8D0p
References (64)
-
R. Kennedy, F. Kurtz (1966)
Introduction to financial and managerial accounting -
Benjamin Hermalin, M. Weisbach (1991)
The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm PerformanceFinancial Management, 20
-
S. Kole (1995)
Measuring managerial equity ownership: a comparison of sources of ownership dataJournal of Corporate Finance, 1
-
T. Breusch, A. Pagan (1980)
The Lagrange Multiplier Test and its Applications to Model Specification in EconometricsThe Review of Economic Studies, 47
-
R. Hubbard, Darius Palia (1994)
Executive Pay and Performance: Evidence from the U.S. Banking IndustryGovernance
-
Moshe Kim, Vojislav Maksimovic (1990)
Debt and Input MisallocationJournal of Finance, 45
-
Jennifer Gaver, K. Gaver (1993)
Additional evidence on the association between the investment opportunity set and corporateJournal of Accounting and Economics, 16
-
E. Jackson, K. Cohen, R. Cyert (1966)
Theory of the FirmSouthern Economic Journal, 32
-
Bengt Holmstrom (1979)
Moral Hazard and ObservabilityThe Bell Journal of Economics, 10
-
F. Lichtenberg, D. Siegel (1989)
The Effects of Leveraged Buyouts on Productivity and Related Aspects of Firm BehaviorERPN: Leveraged Buyouts (Sub-Topic)
-
C. Hsiao (1989)
Analysis of Panel Data -
Who's Who in Finance and Industry -
Eric Noreen, Mark Wolfson (1981)
Equilibrium Warrant Pricing-Models And Accounting For Executive Stock-OptionsJournal of Accounting Research, 19
-
Magazine Ah (1997)
The impact of regulation.Medical device technology, 8
-
C. Holderness, R. Kroszner, D. Sheehan (1998)
Were the Good Old Days that Good? Changes in Managerial Stock Ownership Since the Great DepressionCorporate Finance: Governance
-
John Mcconnell, H. Servaes (1990)
Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate valueJournal of Financial Economics, 27
-
W. Johnson, R. Magee, Nandu Nagarajan, Harry Newman (1985)
An analysis of the stock price reaction to sudden executive deaths: Implications for the managerial labor marketJournal of Accounting and Economics, 7
-
(2000)
Theory of the Firm : Managerial Behavior , Agency Costs and Ownership Structure -
(1974)
The 15 Top-Ranked Graduate Business Schools in the United States -
N. Barberis, Maxim Boycko, A. Shleifer, N. Tsukanova (1995)
How Does Privatization Work? Evidence from the Russian ShopsJournal of Political Economy, 104
-
Darius Palia, F. Lichtenberg (1999)
Managerial ownership and firm performance: A re-examination using productivity measurementJournal of Corporate Finance, 5
-
Kevin Murphy (1985)
Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: An empirical analysisJournal of Accounting and Economics, 7
-
C. Herman, E. Zabloski (1979)
Introduction to financial and managerial accounting.Pharmacy management combined with the American journal of pharmacy : PM, 151 1
-
S. Rosen (1990)
Contracts and the Market for ExecutivesNBER Working Paper Series
-
R. Hubbard, Darius Palia (1995)
Benefits of Control, Managerial Ownership, and the Stock Returns of Acquiring FirmsNBER Working Paper Series
-
J. Angrist, G. Imbens, D. Rubin (1993)
Identification of Causal Effects Using Instrumental Variables -
M. Jensen, Jerold Warner (1988)
The Distribution of Power Among Corporate Managers, Shareholders, and DirectorsCorporate Finance: Governance
-
Michael Jensen (1986)
Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and TakeoversIndustrial Organization & Regulation eJournal
-
J. Core, Robert Holthausen, D. Larcker (1999)
Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance 1 The financial supJournal of Financial Economics
-
Clifford Smith, R. Watts (1992)
The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend, and Compensation PoliciesJournal of Financial Economics, 32
-
D. Yermack (1996)
Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directorsJournal of Financial Economics, 40
-
Kevin Murphy, M. Jensen (1990)
Performance Pay and Top Management IncentivesLabor: Personnel Economics
-
Hyun-Han Shin, René Stulz (1998)
Are Internal capital Markets EfficientQuarterly Journal of Economics, 113
-
F. Hayashi (1982)
TOBIN'S MARGINAL q AND AVERAGE q: A NEOCLASSICAL INTERPRETATIONEconometrica, 50
-
Reference Book of Corporate Managements, Dun and Bradstreet -
René Stulz (1988)
Managerial control of voting rights: Financing policies and the market for corporate controlJournal of Financial Economics, 20
-
Jason Barro, R. Barro (1990)
Pay, Performance, and Turnover of Bank CEOsJournal of Labor Economics, 8
-
D. Hillier, Mark Grinblatt, S. Titman (1997)
Financial markets and corporate strategy -
M. Jensen (1993)
The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control SystemsCGA: Governance & Internal Control Systems (Topic)
-
Kevin Murphy, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny (1990)
The Allocation of Talent: Implications for GrowthEntrepreneurship & Economics eJournal
-
J. Chevalier, Glenn Ellison (1999)
Are some mutual fund managers better than others -
Kevin Murphy (1986)
Incentives, learning, and compensation: a theoretical and empirical investigation of managerial labor contractsThe RAND Journal of Economics, 17
-
R. Morck, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny (1988)
Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical AnalysisJournal of Financial Economics, 20
-
Sanford Grossman, O. Hart (1983)
AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMEconometrica, 51
-
M. Useem, Jerome Karabel (1986)
Pathways to Top Corporate ManagementAmerican Sociological Review, 51
-
F. Black, Myron Scholes (1973)
The Pricing of Options and Corporate LiabilitiesJournal of Political Economy, 81
-
H. Leland., David Pyle. (1977)
INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATIONJournal of Finance, 32
-
A. Berle, G. Means (1932)
The Modern Corporation and Private Property -
S. Rosen (1982)
Authority, Control, and the Distribution of EarningsThe Bell Journal of Economics, 13
-
C. Himmelberg, R. Hubbard, Darius Palia, Anup Agrawal, George Baker, Sudipto Bhattacharya, Steve Bond, Charles Calomiris, Harold Demsetz, Rob Hansen, Laurie Hodrick, Randy Kroszner, Mark Mitchell, Andrew Samwick, Bill Schwert, Scott Stern, Robert Vishny, Karen Wruck, Darius Palia (1999)
Understanding the Determinants of Managerial Ownership and the Link Between Ownership and PerformanceJournal of Financial Economics, 53
-
A. Cartter, R. Sawyer (1966)
An Assessment of Quality in Graduate EducationPhysics Today, 19
-
B. Hall, Jeffrey Liebman (1997)
Are CEOS Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?Organizations & Markets eJournal
-
(1973)
Report on College Characteristics, manuscript, Harvard-MIT Joint Center for Urban Affairs -
(2001)
The Review of Financial Studies -
Bengt Holmstrom, Paul Milgrom (1991)
Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job DesignJournal of Law Economics & Organization, 7
-
Darius Palia (2000)
The Impact of Regulation on CEO Labor MarketsThe RAND Journal of Economics, 31
-
D. Yermack (1994)
Do Corporations Award CEO Stock Options EffectivelyLabor: Personnel Economics
-
Jensen Mc, Mu Kj (1990)
CEO incentives-its not how much you pay, but how.Harvard Business Review, 68
-
M. Jensen, Kevin Murphy (1990)
CEO Incentives: It's Not How Much You Pay, But HowSPGMI: Compustat Fundamentals (Topic)
-
R. Gibbons, Kevin Murphy (1991)
Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and EvidenceJournal of Political Economy, 100
-
H. Demsetz, K. Lehn (1985)
The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and ConsequencesJournal of Political Economy, 93
-
J. Hausman, W. Taylor (1981)
Panel Data and Unobservable Individual EffectsJournal of Econometrics, 16
-
Philip Berger, E. Ofek, D. Yermack (1995)
Managerial Entrenchment and Capital Structure DecisionsIO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets
-
J. Houston, C. James (1995)
CEO compensation and bank risk Is compensation in banking structured to promote risk takingJournal of Monetary Economics, 36
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Copyright
- Copyright The Society for Financial Studies 2001
- ISSN
- 0893-9454
- eISSN
- 1465-7368
- DOI
- 10.1093/rfs/14.3.735
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Much of the empirical literature that has examined the functional relationship between firm value and managerial ownership levels assumes that managerial ownership levels are exogenous and are the only component of managerial compensation related to firm performance. This assumption is contrary to the theoretical and empirical literature wherein managerial compensation is endogenously determined and includes both shares and options. Using instruments for managerial compensation and panel data to control for unobservable heterogeneity in the firm’s contracting environment, we estimate a system of simultaneous equations. We find that firms are in equilibrium when they endogenously set their chief executive officer’s compensation.
Journal
The Review of Financial Studies – Oxford University Press
Published: Jul 1, 2001