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Estimating the Value of Political Connections

Estimating the Value of Political Connections By RAYMD FISMAN* As the Indesian ecomy went into a downward spiral in the latter half of 1997, there was much speculati and debate as to the reass behind the sudden decline. Most explanatis gave at least some role to investor panic, which had led to a massive outflow of foreign capital. At the root of this hysteria, however, were ccerns that the capital that had flowed into Indesia and elsewhere in Southeast Asia had not been used for productive investments. Much of this discussi focused the role of political cnectis in driving investment. The claim was that in Southeast Asia, political cnectedness, rather than fundamentals such as productivity, was the primary determinant of profitability and that this had led to distorted investment decisis. Obviously, the degree to which this type of problem was truly respsible for the Asian collapse depends very much the extent to which cnectedness really was a primary determinant of firm value. In making the argument that this was in fact the case, anecdotes about the business dealings of President Suharto’s children were often cited as evidence. Such stors suggest that the value of some firms may have been highly dependent their political cnectis. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Economic Review American Economic Association

Estimating the Value of Political Connections

Fisman, Raymond
American Economic Review , Volume 91 (4) – Sep 1, 2001
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References (22)

Publisher
American Economic Association
Copyright
Copyright © 2001 by the American Economic Association
Subject
Shorter Papers
ISSN
0002-8282
DOI
10.1257/aer.91.4.1095
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

By RAYMD FISMAN* As the Indesian ecomy went into a downward spiral in the latter half of 1997, there was much speculati and debate as to the reass behind the sudden decline. Most explanatis gave at least some role to investor panic, which had led to a massive outflow of foreign capital. At the root of this hysteria, however, were ccerns that the capital that had flowed into Indesia and elsewhere in Southeast Asia had not been used for productive investments. Much of this discussi focused the role of political cnectis in driving investment. The claim was that in Southeast Asia, political cnectedness, rather than fundamentals such as productivity, was the primary determinant of profitability and that this had led to distorted investment decisis. Obviously, the degree to which this type of problem was truly respsible for the Asian collapse depends very much the extent to which cnectedness really was a primary determinant of firm value. In making the argument that this was in fact the case, anecdotes about the business dealings of President Suharto’s children were often cited as evidence. Such stors suggest that the value of some firms may have been highly dependent their political cnectis.

Journal

American Economic Review – American Economic Association

Published: Sep 1, 2001

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