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D. Parfit (1986)
Reasons and Persons
I. Persson (2004)
The Root Of The Repugnant Conclusion And Its Rebuttal
G. Arrhenius, J. Ryberg, T. Tännsjö (2004)
The Repugnant ConclusionStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
N. Holtug, K. Lippert‐Rasmussen (2006)
Egalitarianism: New Essays on the Nature and Value of Equality
I. Persson (2001)
Equality, Priority and Person-Affecting ValueEthical Theory and Moral Practice, 4
Derek Parfit has argued that, in contrast to prioritarianism, egalitarianism is exposed to the levelling down objection, i.e., the objection that it is absurd that a change which consists merely in the betteroff losing some of their well-being should be in one way for the better. In reply, this paper contends that (1) there is a plausible form of egalitarianism which is equivalent to another form of prioritarianism than the Parfitian one, a relational rather than an absolute form of prioritarianism, and that (2), although this relational or egalitarian form of prioritarianism is hit by the levelling down objection, the Parfitian form is also hit by it, or worse objections, if it is fully worked out.
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice – Springer Journals
Published: Jun 1, 2008
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