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Why Levelling Down could be Worse for Prioritarianism than for Egalitarianism

Why Levelling Down could be Worse for Prioritarianism than for Egalitarianism Derek Parfit has argued that, in contrast to prioritarianism, egalitarianism is exposed to the levelling down objection, i.e., the objection that it is absurd that a change which consists merely in the betteroff losing some of their well-being should be in one way for the better. In reply, this paper contends that (1) there is a plausible form of egalitarianism which is equivalent to another form of prioritarianism than the Parfitian one, a relational rather than an absolute form of prioritarianism, and that (2), although this relational or egalitarian form of prioritarianism is hit by the levelling down objection, the Parfitian form is also hit by it, or worse objections, if it is fully worked out. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Springer Journals

Why Levelling Down could be Worse for Prioritarianism than for Egalitarianism

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice , Volume 11 (3) – Jun 1, 2008

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References (5)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 by Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
Subject
Philosophy; Ontology; Political Philosophy; Ethics
ISSN
1386-2820
eISSN
1572-8447
DOI
10.1007/s10677-007-9102-6
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Derek Parfit has argued that, in contrast to prioritarianism, egalitarianism is exposed to the levelling down objection, i.e., the objection that it is absurd that a change which consists merely in the betteroff losing some of their well-being should be in one way for the better. In reply, this paper contends that (1) there is a plausible form of egalitarianism which is equivalent to another form of prioritarianism than the Parfitian one, a relational rather than an absolute form of prioritarianism, and that (2), although this relational or egalitarian form of prioritarianism is hit by the levelling down objection, the Parfitian form is also hit by it, or worse objections, if it is fully worked out.

Journal

Ethical Theory and Moral PracticeSpringer Journals

Published: Jun 1, 2008

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