Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Loading next page...
/lp/emerald-publishing/the-effects-of-audit-committee-activity-and-independence-on-corporate-NSt07zlbxk
References (7)
-
K. Menon, J. Williams (1994)
The use of audit committees for monitoringJournal of Accounting and Public Policy, 13
-
Lawrence Abbott, Susan Parker (2000)
Auditor Selection and Audit Committee CharacteristicsEar and Hearing, 19
-
Joseph Carcello, T. Neal (1997)
Audit Committee Characteristics and Auditor Reporting -
L. Deangelo (1981)
Auditor independence, ‘low balling’, and disclosure regulationJournal of Accounting and Economics, 3
-
Patricia Dechow, Richard Sloan, A. Sweeney (1996)
Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC*Contemporary Accounting Research, 13
-
E. Altman (1968)
FINANCIAL RATIOS, DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS AND THE PREDICTION OF CORPORATE BANKRUPTCYJournal of Finance, 23
-
E. Fama, M. Jensen (1983)
Agency Problems and Residual ClaimsThe Journal of Law and Economics, 26
- Publisher
- Emerald Publishing
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2000 MCB UP Ltd. All rights reserved.
- ISSN
- 0307-4358
- DOI
- 10.1108/03074350010766990
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Examines whether two key audit committee characteristics combined, activity and independence, reduce likely fraud or aggressive financial statement actions. Utilizes evidence on potential of Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) recommendations regarding composition of audit committees, and further involves a sample of 156 firms — 78 subject to SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases and 78 similar sized non‐sanctioned firms. Closes by stating future research may be required regarding young and mature firms ‐ that could affect monitoring.
Journal
Managerial Finance – Emerald Publishing
Published: Nov 1, 2000
Keywords: Audit; Fraud; Financial Misstatement; Research; USA