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Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence from Syndicated Loans

Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence from Syndicated Loans ABSTRACT I empirically explore the syndicated loan market, with an emphasis on how information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers influences syndicate structure and on which lenders become syndicate members. Consistent with moral hazard in monitoring, the lead bank retains a larger share of the loan and forms a more concentrated syndicate when the borrower requires more intense monitoring and due diligence. When information asymmetry between the borrower and lenders is potentially severe, participant lenders are closer to the borrower, both geographically and in terms of previous lending relationships. Lead bank and borrower reputation mitigates, but does not eliminate information asymmetry problems. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Journal of Finance Wiley

Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence from Syndicated Loans

The Journal of Finance , Volume 62 (2) – Apr 1, 2007

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References (48)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
© 2007 the American Finance Association
ISSN
0022-1082
eISSN
1540-6261
DOI
10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01219.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

ABSTRACT I empirically explore the syndicated loan market, with an emphasis on how information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers influences syndicate structure and on which lenders become syndicate members. Consistent with moral hazard in monitoring, the lead bank retains a larger share of the loan and forms a more concentrated syndicate when the borrower requires more intense monitoring and due diligence. When information asymmetry between the borrower and lenders is potentially severe, participant lenders are closer to the borrower, both geographically and in terms of previous lending relationships. Lead bank and borrower reputation mitigates, but does not eliminate information asymmetry problems.

Journal

The Journal of FinanceWiley

Published: Apr 1, 2007

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